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A review of the state of the art in assessing the 
security of power system operations is provided. 
Emphasis is placed on the overall philosophy of pre-
ventive system operation, and the computational and 
data acquisition systems required for on-line monito-
ring and analysis of system security. Critical 
comparison of various approaches is provided. Recom-
mendations for effective security assessment for a 
single company, as well as, an interconnection are 
provided. Furthermore, industry practices and guide-
lines in the area of system security are presented and 
commented upon. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Definition of System Security  
A secure operating state of a power system is 
defined as that state which is invaluable to unaccept-
able system conditions such as: 
• cascading outages; 
• system separation; 
• wide-spread outages (blackouts); 
violation of emergency limits of line current; 
• bus voltages, or system frequency; and 
• loss of synchronization among generators. 
Simply stated, the process of security assessment 
consists of judging if the system is in a secure  
operating state. No power system, however, is secure  
in the above sense. Catastrophic disturbances, 
simultaneous critical faults, or other improbable but 
possible occurrences can bring any utility system into 
any or all of these unacceptable system conditions. 
Economics and the realities of physical construction 
dictnte that some attainable measure of security be 
supplied. This measure is usually in terms of the 
invulnerability of the system to single faults, single 
occurrences of loss of generation, or other credible 
contingencies. 
It should be noted immediately that it is the 
security of the bulk power transmission that is being 
considered. Customer service interruptions at the 
distribution level are not included although they may 
occur if the bulk power transmission system fails. 
1.2 Historical Background  
Historically, the system planner always has 
considered the security of the system by providing 
comfortable margins of generating capacities, trans-
mission line capabilities and tie-line interconnections. 
The planner, however, could not predict all possible 
system configurations and system demands. A system 
which is well planned under adequate engineering 
assumptions for secure operation will not be so nee-
"2 Sar!IY under unpredlcted conditions, The 1965 
Northeast blackout and similar events (4381 showed 
clearly that a well-planned system is indeed vulnerable 
to possible disturbances and that this vulnerability 
can be catastrophic. Not only the planner but now the 
system operator is very much concerned about security 
and its assessment. 
The first analysis of the problem of security 
was by Stienmetz (1) who studied the effect of dis-
turbances on systems' stability. In 1926, Evans and 
Wagner (2) proposed some stability-enhancing schemes like 
the use of a ground-current relay to decrease prime-
mover input by governor control. And in 1930, Summers 
and McClure (3) proposed using a dynamic braking resis-
tor for stability augmentation. Many works on related 
topics appearel 6 ince then. However, it was around 1968 
when DyLiacco'. 	formulated the new philosophy of 
secure operation. In essence, he decomposed system 
operation into three states: Normal; Emergency; and 
Restorative. In the Normal State all system equality 
and inequality constraints are satisfied. In the 
Emergency State sane of the inequality constraints are 
violated (e.g., frequency drops, overloading of lines, 
etc.). Finally, in the Restorative State some of the 
equality constraints are not satisfied. (e.g., a 
load area is not serviced but the rest of the system is 
in the Normal State.) Refinements of these definitions 
were later obtained whereby the Normal State was de-
composed into two states: Secure and Alert (or 
Insecure). A Secure Normal State is a Normal State 
whereby single system contingencies will not cause any 
transitions from the Normal State. In the Alert (or 
Insecure) Normal State a single system contingency can 
cause a transition to an Emergency State. A represen-




Figure 1. Schematic Diagram of System Operating 
States and Associated State Transitions 
Due to Disturbances and Control Action 
1 
IN 
1.3 Applications of Security Assessment Methods  
Analysis of system security is a primary function 
in three major applications: long term planning; 
planning of operations; and minute-by-minute operation. 
Specific applications are listed as follows: 
1. Long-Term Planning  
evaluation of generation capacity 
requirements 
• evaluation of interconnected system 
power exchange capabilities 
• evaluation of transmission system 
adequacy. 
2. Planning of Operations  
• determination of spinning reserve 
requirements in the unit committment 
process 
• scheduling of hourly generation as 
well as interchange scheduling among 
neighboring systems 
• outage dispatching of transmission 
lines and transformers for maintenance 
and system operation. 
3. On-Line Operation  
• monitoring of the operating state of 
the system 
• contingency evaluation 
▪ prediction of the level or measure of 
system security in the near term 
• providing inputs to security enhancement 
functions. 
The primary concern of this report is on on-line 
operation since this is the area where most signifi-
cant recent progress has taken place. The impact of 
this on long-term and operational planning, will 
however, be discussed. 
1.4 General Problem Framework  
Security assessment is part of an overall 
operating strategy to maintain the system in the Normal 
State as long as possible. Inputs to the security 
assessment process consist of: 
• on-line telemetry data provided 
periodically every few seconds 
• mathematical models of the system 
• information on external interconnected 
systems 
• system operating limits 
• types and locations of possible disturbances 
• security enhancement control strategies 
• historical data 
• uncertainties associated with measurements, 
mathematical models and predictions defined 
by means of probability distributions. 
The outputs of the process provide a measure of 
system security. Definition of such a measure is, at 
present, controversial and dependent on certain philo-
sophies to be elaborated upon later. These outputs, 
at any rate, are the basis of security enhancement  
strategies. 043) A strong and mutual coupling exists 
between security assessment and security enhancement. 
Violation of a security limit requires preventive  
control action. However, the availability of an 
adequate corrective strategy means that the system is 
inherently more secure. All of this is done with 
strong regard of operator evaluation and action, and 
consequently, the design of effective on-line inter-
active systems. 
The security assessment process itself consists of 
two primary functions: * 
1. Security;Monitoring: this consists of the 
processing of incoming data, correlating it 
with available data in order to reliably  
determine the operating state of the system 
at present or in the near future. 
2. Security Analysis: this consists of simulating 
the system under various contingency conditions  
in order to evaluate the measure of system 
security and provide inputs to enhancement 
strategies. 
In either of the above functions updated mathema-
tical models of the system are required. These models 
are classified as steady-state (static) and dynamic. 
And each class can be deterministic or stochastic. 
Furthermore, all modeling assumptions, whether in the 
static or dynamic cases, are of varying degress of 
complexity depending on: 
• computational requirements; 
• on-line data requirements; 
• data on model paramters; 
• model reliability; and 
• required solution accuracies. 
System disturbances are classifed into load and 
event disturbances. Load disturbances consist of small 
random fluctuations superimposed on slowly varying 
trend changes. Both the slow trends and the statistics 
of the small random disturbances can be predicted by 
forecasting methods (if the data is available). Event 
disturbances consist of: 
• faults on transmission lines; 
• cascading events due to protective 
relay action following severe overloads 
or violation of operating limits; 
• generator outages due to loss of 
synchronism or malfunctions; 
• sudden and large load changes. 
Transmission line outages are generally due to 
weather (lightning or storms), improper relaying, 
operator errors or accidents (falling trees, airplanes, 
contact by construction equipment, etc.). Most such 
outages will affect single lines. However, multiple 
line outages may occur due to bus faults or accidents 
involving multiple line towers. Therefore they should 
not be disregarded entirely. Statistics on trans-
mission line outages may or may not be available in a 
given utility. In general, however, higher voltage 
lines have smaller outage rates. Generator outage 
statistics are perhaps more understood with data avail-
able on most systems. In general, generator outages 
are more frequent with new units. 
In Table I a summary is provided for the possible 
impact of various disturbance types on system security. 
It is clear from that table that maintaining the system 
in the Secure Normal State should be a highly desirable 
objective provided that the cost of so doing is not 
prohibitive. 
1.5 Summary of Present Status  
Present and projected efforts in the security 
assessment field consist, to our knowledge, in 
activites in the following areas: 
*
The decomposition here is not unique since some 
utilities would use "Security Monitoring" to mean 
both of these primary functions. However, we are 
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f. Development of optimum power flow programs 
with security constraints. 
The remainder of this paper will discuss those 
topics from a critical point of view. Following that, 
a section is devoted to discussions and recommendations. 
2. ANALYSIS OF PRESENT STATUS  
2.1 Steady-State Security Assessment  
In steady-state security assessment use is made 
of nonlinear power flow network models or, in some 
cases, linear steady-state current/voltage models. 
Analysis based on these models is natural since the 
Normal State is essentially in the steady-state and 
since most operating limits can be defined in terms of 
power flow, current and voltage quantities. Further-
more, these models ere amenable to on-line computer 
analysis and are well understood by engineers. 
In the discussion below emphasis will be placed 
on the following topics: 
• steady-state security monitoring; 
• steady-state contingency evaluation; 
contingency evaluation modeling requirements. 
2.1.1 Steady-State Security Monitoring  
A. Data Base Systems  
In steady-state security monitoring the objective 
is to determine, on a minute-by-minute basis, whether 
the system is in the Normal State or not. To do so, 
on-line data acquisition systems are required to 
various degrees of complexity. A minimal data acquisi-
tion system should provide information on the status 
of all major transmission and generation elements 
together with analog data on power flows, generation 
levels and inter-tie flows. The major transmission 
elements to be monitored should be determined in off-
line studies during the planning phase. Such a 
minimal system should have the following capabilities: 
▪ Drive operator displays to show major 
station single line diagrams, key flows 
on major lines, and generation levels; 
and 
• Provide inputs for approximate contingency 
evaluation algorithms like the distribution 
factors algorithm. 
An intermediate system will require an on-line 
ac power flow solution for the main grid network of a 
given utility. The trend, at present is to do so by 
means of extensive data acquisition system (Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition--SCADA), which provides 
status information on all lines, transformers and 
generators together with redundant measurements of 
power flows, voltages, loads and generation levels. 
The statistical techniques of Weighted Least Squares  
estimation coupled with Bad Data Rejection algorithms 
proved reliable, and hopefully accurate, on-line 
power flow solutions. The advantages of this over the 
minimal system are: 
• All power flow outputs, measured or otherwise, 
are available to the display system. 
Furthermore, voltage and various quantities 
provide an aided significant input. 
• Contingency evaluation can be performed using 
ac methods provided adequate external network 
equivalents are available. 
. Short-term bus load forecasting is possible. 
This provide3 a data base for predictive 
security analysis operational planning, (tnd 
possibly, on-line automatic control."-43) 
a. Development of several computationally 
efficient steady-state contingency evaluation 
programs to teat steady-state response to 
generator or line outages. Each program has 
its advantages and limitations and is 
strongly dependent on the type of on-line 
data base used or proposed. 
b. Development of feasible transient and long-
term dynamic stability contingency evaluation  
algorithms which are based on different 
approaches. Some of these include: 
• use of Lyapunov's functions; 
• digital computer numerical integration; 
hybrid computer on-line simulation. 
c. Off-line computation of security functions 
by means of pattern recognition methods to 
be used in on-line operation. 
d. Development of security indices based on 
contingency evaluation to aid the dispatcher 
to assess system security through interactive 
displays. 
e. Development of probabilistic measures of  



































(Historical and Otherwise) 
Figure 2. Major Functions Involving Control 
and Security of System Operation 
Improved economic dispatching through the 
availability of accurate load values and 
network configurations. Here an improved 
B-constant approach or an optimum power 
flow become possible. 
A maximal system would consider the problem of 
interconnected system security. Here a coordination  
computer will act as a medium of data processing of 
vital data of interest to the interconnection as a 
whole. The individual pool members may have inter-
mediate or minimal systems. The coordination computer 
will provide the following added advantages: 
• Ability to perform contingency analysis 
(on a company level or a pool-wide level) 
with accurate knowledge of the status of 
the entire interconnection. 
• Ability to evaluate emergency transfer 
capabilities on-line. 
• Ability to perform pool economic dispatching. 
• Improved emergency and security enhancement 
controls. 
At present, most security monitoring systems are 
of the minimal or intermediate type (see Appendix B). 
However, some large interconnections perform, at least, 
the economic dispatching function on the pool level. 
B. State Estimation 
The role of state estimation is to provide a 
reliable and accurate estimate of bus voltage magnitudes 
and phase angles, real and reactive power flows, as 
well as, real and reactive bus power injections. This 
is achieved by overmeasuring the system with more 
measurements than are needed to solve a load flow pro-
blem. This redundancy enables a form of cross-checking 
among measurements to eliminate any gross measurement 
or system configuration errors. It also makes it 
possible to obtain power flow and injection estimates 
which are more accurate, on the average, than meter 
readings, provided that the network data is itself 
very accurate. 
At present, there are a variety of state 
estimation programs with various characteristics. 
They are all based on the so-called static state esti-
mation concept whereby a snapshot scan of the system 
provides all the information needed for computation. 
Furthermore, they all attempt to minimize the weighted 
least square errors between measured and estimated 
quantities. 
In Table II, tme following state estimation 
methods are compared: * 
1. Sequential State Estimation (SSE)
(87) 
2. American Electric Power Method (AEP)
(83) 
3. AEP'S Method modified to include bus 
voltages and line currents (Modified AEP) 
 
4. Decowkd Weighted Least Squares (Decoupled 
WLS) ° ' 1 
5. Weighted Least Squares (dLS)
(77) 
6. Generalized Load Flow (GLF)
(88) 
In addition to that table, the following comments are 
made: 
(a) All these methods except SSE use sparse 
matrix techniques; 
(b) They are very competitive with one another 
in terms of computational speed; 
(c) An exact comparison among them is difficult 
to obtain since different methods use 
different measurement systems; 
(d) These comparisons are based on our experience 
with simulated tests. Our experience with 
actual system data indicate serious network 
modeling problems whiO Mrades the 
accuracy of solutions. (( 
 approaches to the detection and identifica-
tion of gross measurement or modeling errors have been 
reported. However, there is no report on actual 
operating experience.( 115-119 ) 
2.1.2 Steady-State Contingency Evaluation Methods  
A. Introductory Remarks 
Research on steady-state contingency evaluation 
methods has yielded a wide spectrum of computational 
approaches whereby rational comparisons can be made on 
the basis of (a) computational speed, (b) computational 
storage requirements, and (c) solution accuracies. 
Various modeling assumptions are made for each approach. 
In each case, however, the interest is in predicting 
line loadings, and possibly, voltage and various levels 
in the network under consideration, following single 
or multiple line outages or single generator outages. 
* 
This comparison is primarily subjective based on the 
writers' experience and published literature. 
4 
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1. SSE Suboptimal Mixed 1 or 	2 1 
2. AEP Suboptimal Line Power Flow Only 1 or 2 2 
3. Modified AEP Suboptimal AEP + KV + Line Currents 3 or 4 3 
4. Decoupled WLS Optimal Mixed 3 or 4 or 5 5 
5. WLS Optimal Mixed 6 6 
6. GLF Suboptimal Mixed 4 or 5 4 
In either case, a pre-outage "state" should be avail-
able (e.g., base-case load flow solution). For line 
outages, assumptions pertaining to the load flow 
problem are retained. And for generator outages, 
assumptions related to the redistribution of lost 
generation among the remaining generators are used. 
Line outages produce a significant change in the 
network parameters of the problem. Assuming that the 
pre-outage case is given by 
f(x,p) = 0 
where x is the vector of state variables (complex bus 
voltages) and p is the vector of network parameters, 
then the poet outage case is given by 
f(x + Ax, p + Ap) = 0 	 (2) 
where Ap represents the change in p due to the outage 
and Ax is the resulting change in x. Here f(.,.) 
corresponds to the system's power flow equations. 
Invariably, all contingency evaluation algorithms 
follow either (or a combination) of the following 
approaches: 
(a) Sensitivity Analysis  
Here one writes, 
f(x + Ax, p + Ap) 	f(x,P)+ 0";)3{) 	( O fi'W) lx , p AP 
(3) 
and by implication, one writes: 
Ax V -(6f/6x1 x,p )-1 (6f/601
x,p  AP 
	
(4) 
(b) Improved Sensitivity Analysis  
In this case, it is assumed that the Ap is not 
small. Hence, one writes: 
f(x+ LK, p+Ap)enf(x, p + 	+ (Wx)1 x,p+Ap
Aoc . (5) 
This Leads to the solution: 
Ax 	(of/()xl x,p+Ap )
-1 
 f(x, P AP) • 
	 (6) 
In either of the above approaches, simplifications 
(or approximations) are made regarding the load flow 
equations, (f.,.), the Jacobian matrix, !, or both. 
In the ac methods this permits the use of additional 
iterations to improve solution accuracy. 
The major factor which makes this approach 
computationally efficient is the so-called Matrix 
Inversion Lemma, which in equation form is stated as 
follows: 







-1 C)-1 DT-1 
 A 	(7)  
where 
A = nxn non-singular matrix 
C,D = nxm matrices (normally m= 1, or in<cn) 
I A = mxm identity matrix. 
m 




to that of inverting an mxm matrix provided A-1 is 
available. In most cases, however, the triangular 
factors of A are used within a scheme of sparse 
matrix computation. 
The solution of a generator outage case is 
computationally simple. Here, the post-outage power 
flow equations can be written as: 
	
f(x+ Ax,p) = AS 	 (8) 
where AS represents the change in net power injections 
due to the outage. Ax is obtained by means of 
one or more iterations of the type 
Ax = -(cif/6x)-1 x,pAS . 
, 
	 (9) 
The difficulty, however, is in the evaluation of AS 
itself. The following schemes provide certain possi-
bilities: 
(a) Redistribute lost generation among 
remaining generators by means of 
"participation factors" and iterate 
if slack generation turns out to be 
too excessive; 
(b) Redistribute generation according to 
the economic dispatch criterion; 
(c) Allow slack bus to absorb lost generation, 
Or 
(d) Redistribute lost generation among the 
remaining AGC generators according to 
their participation factors. If more 
MW capacity is needed than is available 
by AGC, exit from program: "System 
Insecure." 
Thus, the main difficulty here is in adequately repre-
senting steady-state response following a generator 
outage without excessive data requirements. 
B. Comparison of Line Outage Methods  
In the bibliography, we have tried to refer to 
most known outage methods. For purposes of comparison, 
however, six representative methods were selected. 
These are: 
1. Distribution Factors Method (DF) 
2. Exact DC Outage Analysis (EDC) 
3. Z-Matrix Method (ZM)
(159) 
4. Stott's Decoupled Load Flow (SDLF)
(167) 
5 
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TABLE III. Summary of Single Branch Outage Procedures of Various Schemes 
# 	METHOD MODEL REPRESENTATION OF LINE i-j OUTAGE 
GRANGE IN FLOW ON 
LINE k-2, OR, CHANGE 
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ij 
L. - real flow on line i-j 	; Z A  . nodal impedance matrix with 	; 
no shunt terms and with shunt 
impedance at slack bus = 1+j1 
E = vector of 
nodal voltages 
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5. Iterative Linear Load Flow (ILLF)
(166) 
 
6. Sachdev-Ibrahim Method (SIM)
(172) 
In Table III, a summary is provided regarding the 
numerical schemes involved. Methods 2-5 make use of 
the Matrix Inversion Lemma while Method 1 is strictly 
a sensitivity analysis method and Method 6 is a 
"compensation-type" method. Table IV provides a com-
parison of these methods from the computational, data 
requirements (type of security monitor), and output 
characteristics points of view. In comparing computa-
tional speed requirements two alternative regimes were 
assumed: 
1. The inverses of matrices are stored as 
as such. This is normally true for DF, 
EDC, and ZM methods. 
2. Only triangular factors of matrices are 
stored. This is normally true for SDLF, 
ILLF, and SIM methods. 
The argument for storing the inverses as such is 
that system operators can restrict the study system to 
those lines which tend to overload as well as those 
that cause the overload. The computational gain in 
speed is of the order of 100:1 over the regime of 
storing triangular factors only. 
2.1.3 Contingency Evaluation Modeling Requirements  
The minimal and intermediate forms of the 
security monitor provide information on the so-called 
internal system with little or no reference to the 
external system (part of which may belong to the 
utility under consideration). In order to perform 
contingency analysis, however, an equivalent repre-
sentation of the external system is necessary. 
The classical approach to static network 
equivalents consists of the following steps: 
(a) Define as boundary buses those internal 
system buses which are connected to the 
external system. 
(b) Eliminate all external system buses 
using the linear model of the nodal 
admittance matrix. This elimination 
creates an equivalent interconnection 
among the boundary buses which has the 
same form of a model admittance matrix. 
(c) The original internal network plus the 
equivalent network form the basis for 
a power flow program. The boundary 
buses, here, retain their original 
classification as (P,V) or (P,Q) buses. 
TABLE IV. Comparison of Computation 
The main criticisms leveled against this 
classical approach are the following: 
(a) The power flow problem is essentially 
nonlinear. Hence, a linear approach 
to equivalencing is, at best, an 
approximation. Experience has shown 
that very poor results are sometimes 
obtained. 
(b) The external system may be very large 
(many thousands of buses) requiring 
considerable effort of data processing. 
Conceivably, a good portion of that 
system has no impact on the internal 
system. 
(c) Boundary buses consist of a combination 
of the old boundary buses and all of 
the eliminated buses. There is no 
reason to believe that the old (P,V) 
or (P,Q) classification remains valid 
after t'le reduction. 
(d) Certain utilities have large numbers 
of boundary buses. The equivalencing 
process will create large numbers of 
interconnections among these buses 
with each boundary bus connected to 
every other boundary bus. Computa-
tionally, the system matrices become 
highly non-sparse. This is detri-
mental to computational speed and 
storage requirements. 
The advantages of this equivalencing approach 
are: 
(a) Simplicity; and 
(b) The retained system is always 
observable (by the security monitor). 
Hence, a base-case solution for 
contingency analysis will be 
available. 
Researchers have tried to overcome some of the 
problems involved in the classical approach. Following 
is a discussion of some of the reported research: 
(a) Approach of Ref. (184): In this approach 
the classical network reduction method is 
retained. However, prior to the reduction, 
a substantial portion of the external system 
is simply removed. The criterion here is 
that all flows to the removed system are 
positive. This maintains a net generation 
surplus in the retained part of the external 
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system. Portions of the external system 
are retained within the internal system 
representation in order to improve solution 
accuracy. The main drawbacks here are that 
the state estimator should be extended to a 
neighbor's utility. Furthermore, sparsity 
can he still sacrificed. 
(b) Approach of Ref. (187): Studies on a 
particular system showed that boundary 
nodes are best represented as (P,V) nodes. 
This prompted the analysis of two alter-
natives. In the first, the equivalent 
system is solved with all boundary nodes 
classified as (P,V) nodes. And in the 
second, the external system is represented 
by the linear DC power flow model. In 
turn, this linear system, rather than the 
admittance matrix, is eliminated. The 
main difficulty here is that the (P,V) 
classification is system-dependent. 
Furthermore, sparsity is still sacrificed 
if the boundary nodes are numerous. 
(c) Approach of Ref. (186): The main concern 
here is the sparsity of the equivalent 
network. It is shown that by retaining 
a portion of the external nodes in the 
equivalent considerable savings in computer 
storage and execution times is possible. 
Obviously, this may require an extension 
of the domain of the state estimator. 
Aside from the above discussion, a significant 
problem remains. In the minimal and intermediate 
security monitors very sketchy on-line information is 
available about the overall external network. A non-
valid equivalent can provide very inaccurate informa-
tion in contingency analysis. Some preliminary effort 
to overcome this difficulty has been reported in 
Ref. (188). Here the equivalent is identified as 
using on-line data from the internal system. However, 
there are no reported test results on these efforts. 
Efforts to achieve valid equivalents by means of 
adequate inter-utility data exchange, thus eliminating 
the need for identification, have not yet succeeded. 
2.2 Transient and Dynamic Stability Security  
Assessment  
2.2.1 Introduction  
Transient stability assessment consists of 
determining if the system's oscillations following a 
short circuit fault will cause loss of synchronism 
among generators. The primary physical phenomenon 
involved here is that of inertial interaction among 
the generators as governed by the transmission net-
work and bus loads. This phenomenon is of short 
duration (1-3 seconds) in general. For longer dura-
tions the dynamics of boilers, turbines and other 
power plant components cannot be ignored. Coupled 
with that is the control action of impedance and 
underfrequency load shedding relays. As a result, 
the effect of a fault-initiated disturbance may con-
tinue past the transient stability phase to the so-
called long-term dynamic stability phase which can be 
of the order of 10-20 minutes or more. Serious 
blackouts that have occurred over the past 15-20 years 
were generally the result of long-term instability 
and sequences of cascading events. The events causing 
these blackouts are given in Ref. (238), and can be 
classified into the following: 
(a) Faults on lines when other system 
components are out for maintenance; 
(b) Loss of generation causing overloaded 
inerties; 
(c) Operator initiated errors; 
(d) Relay malfunction or inadequate 
relay settings. 
Transient stability analysis is much easier 
to conduct than long-term dynamic stability analysis 
both in terms of mcdeling requirements and the dura-
tion of system response times. As will be shown 
below, this has serious implications in regard to 
data base requirements and on-line implementation. 
In the discussion below transient stability assess-
ment is first considered with emphasis on numerical 
solution techniques and the problem of dynamic equiva-
lents. Following that, approaches to long-term 
dynamic stability analysis are discussed. 
2.2.2 Transient Security Assessment  
A. System Modeling`  Requirements  
Each generator is represented electrically as a 
constant voltage source behind is transient reactance. 
Loads are represented as constant impedances or con-
stant load currents which are determined from pre-fault 
load flow conditions. System dynamics are represented 
by the generator second-order torque equation assuming 
constant mechanical inputs. Mathematically one writes 
d d2i 	 i. 
M . --(TJE + D i 	= Pm. - PE. ,
dtl 
where 
i = ith generator index. 
Mi , Di = generator inertia and darning constants, 
respectively 
8. = rotor angle relative to the synchronous 
reference 




= electrical output 
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All electrical outputs and loads are represented by 
load-flow equations or linear voltage-current equations. 
For this mode, pre-outage on-line data require-
ments consist of 
(a) Voltage magnitudes and angles at all 
buses (state estimates) 
(b) Status of all units 
(c) Unit constants 
(d) Network characteristics 
(e) Fault type, duration and location. 
Thus, an intermediate type security monitor will 
be adequate provided the external system is properly 
modeled by a dynamic equivalent. 
Models of higher degree of complexity than the 
above are sometimes desired and used. This may include 
Excitation system model, 
▪ Detailed generator electrical model, 
• Governor control model, and 
• Turbine models. 
B. Stability Analysis 
Two primary approaches are used in the literature 
to perform transient stability analysis: numerical  
integration and the use of Lyapunov's method. Prac-
tically, however, numerical integration is the only 
method used. 
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Several numerical integration approaches have 
been proposed and used. They generally fall under the 
categories of implicit or explicit methods.( 218 ) As 
in all integration schemes, the usual limiting factor 
is the smallest time constant of the system which is 
caused normally by synchronizing oscillations. The 
use of implicit predictor-corrector methods has gener-
ally allowed larger step-sizes while maintaining a 
high level of numerical stability.( 216)  Normally, the 
transient stability program will alternate between an 
integration step and a load-flow solution to solve the 
network equations. Thus, sparse matrix methods can be 
quite effective and useful in this context. 
Attempts to by-pass the limitations of synchro-
nizing oscillations have Wn made in the Dynamic 
Energy Balance approach. (4' 5) Here, a modeling 
assumption is introduced assuming coherency among 
tightly coupled generators. By implication, each 
coherent group is represented by a single inertia 
equation by neglecting all synchronizing oscillations 
within the group. This permits the use of longer 
integration step-sizes and the prediction of system 
conditions over periods of 20 seconds or so. The 
drawback of this approach is that coherent areas 
cannot he determined in advance always. 
In order to improve on the computational speed 
requirements of direct integration Lyapunov's  
stability methods for power systems were developed. 
This involves the derivation of a scalar Lyapunov 
function V(x), where x is the dynamic state vector of 
the system's set of differential equations, which 
has the following properties 
V(0) = 0, i.e., x = 0 is the equilibrium state 
V(x) > 0, x to x A 0 
dt 	S 0, x tn  
where n is a region around the stable point x = 0, 
which is called the region of stability. It can be 
tittawn t hat if, due to a fault, x t n (but x 	0) 
then x -4 0 as t -, m. In Ref.'s (221-234) various 
forms of the Lyapunov function were derived. The 
main difficulty here is that determination of the 
boundary of the stability region 1.9 very difficult 
numerically. In a recent paper 33 	it is claimed 
that such a difficulty can be overcome. However, this 
remains to be demonstrated on a large-scale system. 
The advantages of Lyapunov's method, once the 
above obstacle is cleared, are: 
(a) It can determine quickly if a system is 
stable directly from the post-fault 
condition. 
(b) It can provide a measure of the margin 
of stability for given fault conditions. 
The drawbacks of the method are: 
(a) It cannot predict instability. Thus it 
may produce too many false alarms. 
(b) The Lyapunov function depends strongly 
on the dynamic model chosen. Any in-
crease in modeling complexity may 
invalidate the approach. For example, 
it has been reported that the inclusion 
of network line conductances is detrimental 
to the method. In fairness, however, many 
Lyapunov functions have been obtained in 
which machine saliency and governor action 
are represented. 
C. Dynamic Equivalents 
As in the steady-state case, an equivalent 
representation of the external system is necessary. 
A good dynamic equivalent should have the following 
properties: 
• provide accurate and reliable post-fault 
predictions within the internal system; 
be computationally efficient; 
. require minimal on-line information from 
the external system. 
Methods of generating dynamic equivalents are 
grouped into two classes: those based on coherency 
and those based or linear modal analysis. The 
coherency methods are based on the empirical/heuristic 
assumption that generators tend to swing together in 
coherent groups. A coherent group can be represented 
by one equivalent generator or a group of generators 
which maintain among themselves constant rotor angle 
differences. On the other hand, modal analysis is a 
mathematical approach based on linearlizing system's 
differential equations, performing eigenvalue analysis 
and discarding the irrelevant modes (e.g., those which 
dampen very quickly). 
Coherency based methods differ from one another 
in a variety of detailes like 
• methodology of selecting coherent groups, 
methods of connecting the equivalent machine 
to the original machine nodes, and 
▪ methods of equivalencing exciter, turbin, 
and governor dynamics. 
Reference (259) contains a comprehensive discus-
sion of several dynamic equivalencing methods and 
proposes an automated approach for that purpose. The 
only drawback of this approach is that the equivalent 
is a function of fault location. However, it has the 
advantage of predicting instabilities in the external 
system among the equivalent generators. And this is 
not the case with the modal approach. 
The main conclusion about dynamic equivalents is 
that there are distinct advantages in an automated 
equivalencing approach for on-line as well as off-line 
studies. However, some problems related to dependency 
of the equivalent on fault location remain to be 
solved. Furthermore, validation of the results using 
actual system measurements has not been attempted yet. 
2.2.3 Long Term Dynamic Response Assessment  
The bojectives of this type of assessment are: 
. Evaluation of dynamic reserve response 
characteristics including distribution of 
reserves and effect of fast starting units; 
• Evaluation of emergency control strategies 
like load shedding by underfrequency relays, 
fast valving, dynamic bracking, and others. 
These objectives fall primarily under system 
planning, control system design, as well as, post-
disturbance analysis. However, the operating implica-
tions cannot be neglected. As reported in Ref. (238), 
most of the major system disturbances in the past 
several years occurred under abnormal system conditions. 
On-lone dynamic response analysis, if feasible, can 
indicate to the operator the catastrophic risks in-
volved with given contingencies. These risks are 
difficult to evaluate effectively by means of steady-
state or transient analysis. 
Two approaches to this problem have been. ;,Rvesti- 
gated so far: the digital 2313) and hybrie 2") 
 computer approaches. 
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Advantages of the digital approach are: 
. Detailed representation of power plant models, 
relay systems and control strategies is 
straightforward; 
Vlexibility in changing system parameters 
or switching from one system to another; 
Relatfvely low cost of running programs on 
geseral purpose computer. 
It , , disadvantage is in the computational time 
requirements which make the digital approach an off-
line tool. The advantage of the hybrid approach 
obviously is computational speed which can be 100 
times faster than real time of simulated process. 
The disadvantages are: 
• Inflexibility in changing network and system 
parameters for on-line contingency analysis. 




 been made to 
overcome this difficulty. 
. Complex modeling of the system can add 
appreciable investment costs in system 
hardware which may not be justified 
economically since the system will have 
to be dedicated for that purpose. However, 
a simple facility for transient analysis 
may be attractive. 
In conclusion, both approaches may prove to be of 
significant value. The digital approach will continue 
to be Indespensible in off-line analysis. And, with 
cost reduction breakthroughs in hybrid systems, on-
line applications may yet result. In either case, 
however, model calibration and validation is still a 
major problem requiring a fair amount of investigative 
work. 
2.3 Pattern Recognition Security Assessment  
The main objective of pattern recognition 
security assessment is to reduce on-line data and 
computational requirements to a minimum. This is 
done at the expense of elaborate off-line computations. 
The original suggest on for using pattern recognition 
came from DyLtacco 	) who proposed a deterministic 
as well as a schochastic approach to the problem. 
Further research as later reported in Ref.'s (283-289). 
The classical methodology of pattern recognition 
consits of defining a pattern vector x whose components 
consist of all the significant variables of the system. 
This vector is evaluated at many representative 
operating conditions to generate what is termed the 
training set. Since many components of the pattern 
vector will he strongly correlated with one another, 
a process of dimensionality reduction is performed to 
identify significant and, hopefully, uncorrelated set 
of variable z 1 ,...,z which are functions of the 
m 	 T 
components of x. Hopefully the vector z = (z 1 ,...,z
m
) 
is much smaller in dimension than x. This process is 
called feature extraction. The final step is to 
determine a function S(z) such that 
> 0 for a secure z 
S(z) 
. 0 for an insecure z 
This is called a security function. Several methods 
are available for generating S(z) based on the form 
S(z) is assumed to take. If S(z) is assumed to be 
linear in the linear programming or least-squares 
methods can be used. Nonlinear functions, like quad-
ratic functions, or multiple functions can be used. 
Here least squares or optimal search methods have been 
successfully used. The main objective of these methods 
however, is to minimize the number of misclassifica-
tions especially when an insecure pattern is mis-
classified as secure. In Ref. (288) a bias term is 
added which yields false alarms but very few misclassi-
fled insecure patterns. Furthermore, different 
security functions can be developed for steady-state 
and transient security. 
From reviewing the literature on the subject one 
obtains a mixed opinion. Several reported tests have 
shown successful results with a record of misclassi-
fication of the order of 1-10% depending on the 
complexity of S(z) and size of the training set. 
Results of failure have also been reported whereby 
it is argued that the computational effort to generate 
an adequate S(z) for a large system is impractical.'. 
From our point of view pattern recognition offers 
the following advantages: 
. It can drastically reduce the requirements 
of on-line security analysis. All what is 
required is the computation of S(z) based 
on direct on-line measurements or state 
estimator outputs. This is particularly 
true in the case of transient security 
assessment where on-line computation is 
time consumcng. 
. The requirement that S(z) > 0, can be used 
as the security constraint in an on-line 
optimum power flow or for preventive as 
well as corrective control measures. 
. The process of training can pinpoint 
weaknesses in the system that may pass 
unnoticed otherwise. 
Disadvantages of the method are: 
. Off-line computation may be too excessive 
• S(z) may very well be sensitive to system 
configuration. Any scheduled or unscheduled 
outages may require the use of a different 
S(z). This can add a considerable computa-
tional burden. 
Pattern recognition can be construed as a 
form of extrapolation from the training 
set to the actual operating state. Since 
insecurity will arise as a result of 
abnormal operating conditions this extra-
polation may give poor results. 
2.4 Measures of Security  
2.4.1 Objectives and Types of Security Measures  
Contingency evaluation provides the main working 
tool to answer the various "what if questions posed 
automatically or by the operator. A measure of  
security is intended to summarize the information 
resulting from many contingency checks in a simple 
form to be used by the operator as a guide for pre-
ventive control action. 
In general two types of security measures have 
been proposed: deterministic and probabilitic. In 
the deterministic case listing of contingencies that 
may cause emergencies is provided to the operator, 
together with information on the security of each 
case. The operator will then decide what to do 
either through experienced judgement or by inter-
rogating programs for corrective action. In the 
probabilistic case two approaches have been proposed: 
(a) Security indices approach; 
(b) Reliability analysis approach. 
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2.4.2 Security Indices  
Ref. (263) contains a comprehensive analysis of 
the idea of security indices. It differentiates be- 
tween steady-state and transient indices. 
In the steady-state case consideration is given 
to the following indices: 
line and transformer MVA flow index 
. bus voltage index 
generator reactive reserve index.
For each index type an index function f(x) is defined 
ion a component by component basis. This function 
assumes the value of 1.0 when the corresponding compo- 
nent is operated within safe limits. It assumes 
'monotonically decreasing values from 1.0 to zero as 
the range of component operation varies from the safe 
to the unacceptable limit. Beyond the unacceptable 
limit this function is zero. The form of this function 
between the safe and unacceptable limits is cubic, 
quadratic and linear for line, bus voltage and re- 
active reserves indices respectively. For each steady-
steady contingency k the following index is computed 
N 	 N 
?k = E wikf(x ik) / E wik 
iml 	 1=1 
where i ranges over all relevant components (e.g., 
liaea and transformers, or bus voltages, etc.) and 
w
ik 
 arc weighting factor (e.g., line power flows for 
the line index). Finally for each index one computes 
M 
I= E ok Pk / E al( 
 k=1 	k=1 
where k ranges over all contingencies and uk is the 
probability of occurance of that contingency. 
Interpretation of the above approach based on 
judgement by its authors is summarized as follows: 
Choice of soft rather than hard constraints 
can account, at least heuristically, for the 
fact that violation of steady-state limits 
can be tolerated for a short time period 
which is normally of the order of a few 
minutes. 
The Hecurtly index f although evaluated 
using certain probabilities, Le not in 
itself the probability of system insecurity. 
It is only an index whose absolute value is 
dependent on system size. 
• As a result of the above remark, the index 
becomes a starting point for more detailed 
analysis whereby the worst cases of limit 
violations are displayed to the operator. 
In the case of transient security assessment  
reduction of the information in the form of an index 
is even more desirable than the steady-state case. 
Che operator simply cannot cope with large numbers 
if swing curves. Again in Ref. (263) two types of 
:raneient security indices are proposed: 
(a) Maximum angle separation index; 
(b) Apparent impedance index. 
The maximum angle index is given by 
9
k 










9k. 4  8max 
0 if' 
Z z ij 
contingency swing factor ok is defined such that 
a 
Loss of synchronism will occur whenever Z
ij 
would cross 
the line segment [0,1]. Based on this, a contingency 
swing factor 	forthe kth contingency can be 
defined: 
alc 4 0 as clic -* 0 
a
K 
4 1 as d
K 
where dK is the distance of Z.. 
1j 
from the segment [0,1]. 
2.4.3 Reliability Pnalysis Approach  
Application of reliability analysis methods to 
on-line security assessment was originally attempted in 
the evaluation of spinning reserve requirements as a 
function of the near-time future.( 272 Y System con-
tingencies consisted of load forecasts and their 
cuncertainties as well as generator outages described 
by outage probabilities. A risk function is defined 
as the probability of insufficient generating 
capacity and is illustrated in Fig. 3. In this figure 
it is assumed that at t = 0, the risk is zero. As t 
increases, the load increases causing smaller reserve 
margins and a non-zero probability of insufficient 
reserves. At t = t, a reserve unit is added and 
obviously this decre
R
ases the risk instantaneously as 
shown. The decision to add the reserve unit at t
R 
generation i and j at time t due to fault k. 
Obviously, if 8 k > 180° instability would occur. 
Normally 8k is limited to a certain maximum which 
depends on the system (B max r- 180° - 200 0 ). A 
Subs 
deft
equently, a composite transient stability index is 
ined considering all contingencies. 
In the apparent impedance index, one evaluates 
whichis the apparent impedance "seen" by relay at 
terminal i of line 1-j. A more appropriate quantity 
is 
11 
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depends on exceeding the minimum risk level R. This 
level is decided upon by operational experience. 
Further elaborations upon this approach considers the 
inclusion of standby generators of different start-up 
response times. Start-up failures are included in a 
Markov-type model to represent more accurately the 
various risk probabilities. A key formula which is 
developed here is a security function defined by 
S(t) = E P i  (t) Q(t) 
where Pi (t) is the probability that the system is in 
state i at time t and, Q i (t) is the probability that 
state i constitutes a breach of system security. 
This idea of a security function is used in 
' Ref. (341) in conjunction with on-line system security 
optimization. In that reference the following function 
is defined 
E PELine 	Overload) No Outages]P[No Outages] 
+ E E PELine t, Overload 1 Line k Out1PELine K Out] 
+EE PELine Overload I Gen. j Out]PEGen. j Out] 
The availability of the system is given by 
a = 1 - S(g) 
In the evaluation of S(g) load uncertainty for the 
next instant is accounted for by means of normally 
distributed random vectors with appropriate means 
and standard deviations. An acceptable availability 
limit a is established. And this becomes the basis 
for preventive or corrective action via security-
constrained optimization. 
2.5 Security-Constrained Optimization  
Security constrained optimization consists of 
solving the problem of the allocation of generation 
subject to 
(a) power flow constraints - equalities 
(b) operating constraints - inequalities, and 
(c) security constraints - inequalities. 
While minimizing a performance criterion which is 
usually, but not necessarily, the cost of generation. 
Historically, an approximate form of the equality 
constraints has been (and is still being) used in 
conjunction with Economy Dispatch with a loss 
formula. 
The availability of on-line state estimation now 
permits the use of load-flow equations directly as 
equality constraints. Furthermore, efficient security 
analysis programs permit the computation of security 
constraints either in the form of operating limit 
violations following a contingency or in the form of 
security functions. 
Table V provides a summary comparison of a sample 
of security constrained optimization methods. A few 
remarks are in order regarding this table. 
(a) Method No. (3) makes a distinction 
between a "global" and a "local" system 
security. In the global case all 
security constraints are satisfied. In 
the local case, allowance is provided 
for short-term (15 min.) violations of 
line loading limits since the thermal 
limit is not reached instantaneously. 
TABLE V. Comparison of a Sample of Methods of 
Security Constrained Optimization 
METHOD 	
PERFORMANCE 	SECURITY 	SOLUTION 
CRITERION CONSTRAINTS METHOD 
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(b) Method No. (4) discusses the important 
topic of security constrained operational 
planning by incorporating the unit 
committment problem into the formulation. 
(c) Method No. (5) provides a novel approach 
based on reliability analysis and the 
"inconvenience level" associated with 
power outages. 
(d) Method No. (6) emphasizes the point that 
when the system becomes vulnerable, the 
economic criterion may have to be ignored 
and replaced by a strictly security 
criterion. 
In one respect security constrained optimization 
is an attempt to replace the operator as much as 
possible, by maintaining the system in the Secure 
Normal State as long as possible. It thus combines 
security assessment and enhancement. However, this is 
still costly from the computational viewpoint. 
3. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
In our opinion, the main considerations in further 
progress in the security assessment process are: 
(a) methodologies to reduce computational 
requirements; 
(b) cost of insecurity, or the risk involved 
in insecure operation; 
(c) accuracy End reliability of the analysis 
effort; 
(d) role of the operator; 
(e) interconnected system security assessment. 
The remaining part of this section is devoted to 
brief discussions of these items. 
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3.1 Methodologies to Reduce Computational  
Requirements  
As has been shown earlier, considerable effort 
has been, and continues to be spent on developing very 
efficient digital algorithms (and hybrid systems) to 
reduce the time required for contingency analysis. 
In spite of this, a complete security assessment pro-
cess based on frequent steady-state and transient 
contingency analysis is either impossible or imprac-
tical with present systems. Various possibilities to 
overcome this are suggested: 
(a) Predictive security assessment  
With the aid of bus load forecasting
(143) 
one can perform the following function 
planning of secure operations involving 
unit cumaittment, generation and tie-line 
scheduling, and scheduling of maintenance 
outages. This may also involve the 
monitoring of key quantities. 
predictive secure operation for the next 
hour or so involving the identification 
of critical outages that need to be 
monitored closely. 
(b) Pre-screening computation  
Fast and approximate algorithms can 
resolve the issue for many contingencies 
that are trivially secure. The more accur-
ate algorithms will, consequently, be 
called upon less frequently. For example, 
the distribution factors method can be used 
to pre-screen contingencies for the more 
accurate ac methods. Similarly, steady-
state analysis can pre-screen cases for 
transient analysis by considering steady-
state stability limits. This will require 
an analysis of how much information can be 
derived from various types of analysis. 
And this can be the basis for a sequential 
pre-screening process. 
(c) Stochastic power flow analysis  
Stochastic power f1own(141,142,144,154)  
can Ho pot to good use. in determining 
margins of uncertainty, and consequently, 
the probability of insecurity. This has 
been achieved in Ref. (339) in computing a 
probabilistic measure of security. The use 
of stochastic load flows is pertinent in 
conjunction with predictive analysis both 
for next hour or next day forecasting. 
3.2 Cost of Insecurity  
Reliability analysis can be put to good use in 
predicting the probability of system interruptions, 
given a computational methodology. This has been 
successfully applied in generation capacity planning 
whereby an acceptable risk of insufficient generation 
is assumed. This risk is based on accepted reliability 
standards and ccunimc considerations. 
The cost of an outage causing a blackout can be 
measured in terms of 
lost energy serviced; 
inconvenience and possible danger to the public; 
▪ embaraasment by utilities; 
▪ security of the blackout; and 
frequency of occurance. 
If quantifiable, such factors can be introduced in 
computing the cost of insecurity. For example, one 
can express such cost as: 
C I 	P. C. 
where C I is defined as the cost of insecurity, P i is 
the probability of the ith outage and Gi is the cost 
associated with the outcome of that outage. The cost 
associated with the outage of the outage will depend 
on any of the following factors: 
Availability of post-outage corrective 
control measures--for thermal limit 
violations a minimum time of a few minutes 
is available for correction. For transient 
stability cases, measures such as dynamic 
breaking, fist valving and capacitor 
switching ms .y also be available. In such 
cases the coat associated with limit 
violations may be quite small. 
Possibility of cascading events. Here 
dynamic stability may be involved requring, 
at least, a gross estimate of the resulting 
effects. Modeling of load-shedding logic 
may be of value in this case. At any rate, 
the cost associated with the limit violation 
will be very high. 
Once, this cost criterion is established, it can 
be used directly in the security constrained optimiza-
tion program or in the interactive operator display 
by showing him the costs associated with serious limit 
violations. 
3.3 Accuracy and Reliability of the Analysis Effort  
In Table VI a summary is provided for various 
elements of inaccuracy in on-line security assessment 
and, methods for accuracy improvement and their status. 
From this table it is obvious that the major bottle-
necks to reliable security assessment are: 
(a) External network status 
(b) External network equivalent representation 
(c) Parameters of lines and transformers 
(d) Component models of dynamic system 
(e) Dynamic equivalent representation. 
In order to combat the effects of such bottlenecks 
the following steps seem to be necessary. 
. Assessment of the extent of inaccuracies in 
various models in terms of probability 
distributions or, simply, standard deviations. 
Analysis of the impact of such inaccuracies on 
security assessment results.( 62 ) Seemingly 
large inaccuracies may have little impact on 
such results, On the other hand, small modeling 
errors in some cases may be detrimental. 
. Study of combined hardware/software approaches 
to eliminate the impact of these inaccuracies. 
Conceivably, on-line information exchange 
among neighboring utilities may become necessary. 
The study will help in minimizing to costs of 
such endeavors. 
Based on the above, the following comments are 
in order: 
. A redundant measurement system coupled with 
state estimation software can provide most 
of the data needed for the above studies. 
This is not the case with a minimal data base 
system. 
13 










(a) Normal Errors 
(b) Bad Data 
5-2% of Scale 
Unknown 
Measurement Redundancy with 




(a) Internal System 
(b) External System 
Small 
Large 
Model Correction Logic 
(a) On-Line Information Exchange 






(a) Internal System 
(b) External System 
5-10% of Value 
5-10% of Value 
(a) Parameter Estimation 





Dynamic Models Considerable (a) Individual Component Modeling 
(b) Parameter Estimation 
Adequate 
Experimental 
Static Equivalents Medium-Large (a) Engineering Judgement 
(b) New Models 
(c) Parameter Estimation 
(a) Adequate for 
Planning 
(b) Experimental and 
System Dependent 
(c) Experimental 
Dynamic Equivalents Large 	 (a) Heuristic-Automated 





1-5% Different Statistical Methods 
and Good Weather Forecasts 
Experimental 
• The methodology of parameter estimation is a 
strong contender in providing statistically 
validated models for on-line use. 
• The methodology of shochastic load flow is 
significant in providing with a quick summary 
of system statistical errors. This makes 
possible an effective use of bus load fore- 
casting in predictive security analysis. 
. Engineering ingenuity is still indespensible 
in providing new approaches and in interpreting 
results. 
13.4 Role of the Operator  
The advantages of the operator over automated 
software systems are: 
. He relies on a global perception of events 
in interpreting results; 
. He can take into consideration peculiar 
situations not originally programmed; 
He can be trained to assess the impact 
of a given contingency; 
• He can override the computer when the results 
are unreasonable. 
Obviously his main disadvantage (or limitations) 
are: 
. Slow reaction time; 
. Judgement is dependent on training and 
intellegence of particular operators; 
• Knowledge of software capabilities and 
limitations is operator-dependent. 
Table VII provides a summary comparison of the 
overall relative roes of the operator vis-a-vis the 
software system. In essence, we see the operator as 
being in the position to interrogate and then judge 
the system. The interrogation and judgement can take 
the following forms: 
(a) Simple--contingency checking and listing 
of limit violations for "critical" 
contingencies; 
(b) Interpretive--assess dollar (or other)costs 
of a preventive control measure; 
(c) Objective seeking--input performance indices 
for optimization programs and then interpret 
results; 
(d) Assess credibility--override software 
recommendations. 
3.5 Interconnected System Security Assessment 
This is a topic of increased significance due to 
the fact the causes of insecurity can originate outside 
the study system. Topics of particular interest here 
are: 
(a) Availability and distribution of reserves 
(spinning and otherwise) in the inter-
connection; 
(b) Power transfer capabilities on the inerties 
during the following emergencies; 
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(c) Identification of external events that are 
detrimental to internal system security. 
In our opinion, an adequate data abase for 
interconnected system security is required. It should 
be based on on-line information exchange. Guidelines 
for secure operation should be established especially 
when security and economy of operation are in conflict 
with one another. 
TABLE VII. Comparison of Operator vs. Software Roles in Security Assessment 
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State of the Art of Security Assessment in the Utility 
Industry  
The Northeast blackout of November 9-10, 1965, 
brought the utility systems of the country to the real-
ization that a degree of vulnerability did exist, and 
that something should be done about the situation. The 
Federal Power Commission (FPC) began its study, and in 
July1967 released its report on that subject. NAPSIC, 
the North American Power Systems Interconnection Com-
mittee--only three years old at the time of the black-
out--also began a new series of studies, and upgraded 
its Operating Guides to provide more emphatic protec-
tion of bulk power system security. 
Most of the 34 Recommendations of the F.P.C. have 
boon translated into action by the utility systems and 
power pool organizations in North America. The recom-
mendations stress coordination at the regional level 
for both planning and operation and for research into 
the remaining difficult problems; strengthening exist-
ing transmission systems and planning future expansions 
to be secure against contingencies; providing secure 
standby power for generating units and their auxiliar-
ies; upgrading relay protective schemes, communications 
networks and display and recording equipment; making 
more effective use of computers; upgrading the train-
ing of operating personnel; making greater use of pre-
ventive maintenance and inter-utility reporting of 
troubles; and preparing for national defense emergen-
cies. 
Several of the recommendations relate to security 
enhancement through controls such as load shedding and 
generator isolation; and one, No. 17, directly addres-
ses the subject of security assessment. It reads as 
follows: "Control Centers should be provided with a  
means for rapid checks on stable and safe capacity  
limits of system elements, The necessity for isola-
ting a line or substation or dropping a generating 
unit, either in an emergency or for planned maintain-
anon, can result in major shifts in network power 
flows. Rapid security checks to determine that vari-
ous elements will he operated under safe limits under 
such modified conditions are essential to prevent un-
safe loading. Rapid security checks are now feasible 
through the use of digital computers." 
This recommendation for on-line contingency anal-
ysis is being followed by a number of utilities, as 
reported in the body of this paper, and research into 
improved security monitoring is currently very active. 
NAPSIC's Operating Guides, like the F.P.C.'s rec-
ommendations, stress operating procedures for proper 
and safe operation, and for inter-utility coordination. 
The individual items are much more detailed than those 
of the F.P.C. 
Operating Guide No. 21, approved in January, 1974 
discusses the subject of security monitoring. The 
Guide recommends making off-line studies to determine 
potential problem areas, and making pre-planned solu-
tions available to dispatchers. It recommends monitor-
ing and display equipment to call attention to danger-
ous situations, and suggests the exchange of vital 
operating data between utilities. Voltage should be 
monitored and voltage schedules centrally coordinated. 
More specifically, the Guide recommends that "Trans-
mission line monitoring should include a means of 
evaluating the effect of loss of transmission or the 
loss of generation or loss of both transmission and 
generation. Scheduled outages of facilities should be 
taken into account in the monitoring scheme." 
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In this appendix we report the results of a ques-
tionnaire which was mailed to some 60 utilities in the 
U.S. and abroad, on the question of security assess-
ment. Following is an interpretation of our findings. 
A. Responses from 8 Large (>10 GW) Utilities in the 
United States and Canada 
None has implemented to satisfaction an on-line, 
continuous or frequent steady-state contingency 
analysis program using power-flow. However, two 
such utilities have implemented this program 
"with problems." 
Only two are using distribution factors for 
contingency analysis. 
Three are us:.ng power flow programs for off-
line analysis of actual disturbances. 
None has any present plans for an on-line trans-
ient security monitor, with or without interact-
ive features. 
Three are using transient analysis programs for 
off-line analysis of disturbances. 
All are using transient analysis programs in the 
system planning process. 
-- 	Seven are using automatic printout device for 
logging. One. plans to add this capability in 
the near futt.rn. 
Five now use input/output CRT display stations, 
and two others plan to do so in the near future. 
-- 	Only one has implemented a form of security in- 
dices, and that one is experiencing problems. 
-- 	There is a strong tendency to use a primary con- 
trol computer for on-line monitoring and display 
functions, and to use a corporate computer for 
off-line studies. 
-- 	Seven plan to utilize a state estimator and a 
bad data rejection program. The measurement 
redundancy ratios are from 1.5 to 2.9. 
All have on-line tie-line power flow data, and 
half of this group have some on-line telemeter-
ing of some high-voltage line status, major 
generating unit status and spinning reserve in 
neighboring systems. 
B. Responses from 28 Medium-Sized Utilities in  the 
United States and Canada  
Only two have implemented an on-line continuous 
or frequent steady-state contingency analysis 
program using power flow. 
Three are now using similar programs but with 
distribution factors. 
18 use off-line power flows for post-analysis of 
disturbances. 
Only one has attempted on-line analysis of con- 
tingencies involving transients. That one is 
satisfied with the program as implemented. 
Eight utilize off-line transient analysis programs 
for post-analysis of disturbances. 
Eleven use an automatic printout device for log- 
ging, and five more plan to do so in the near 
future. 
Only 8 use CRT input/output stations for display, 
with only 4 having near-future plans for such use. 
Three of these utilities have implemented to their 
satisfaction some form of security indices, and 
one plans to do so in the near future. 
In this group there is a more general mix of 
using corporate, standby control and primary con-
trol computers for on-line monitoring and display, 
and of corporated, special-purpose and secondary 
control computers for off-line functions. 
Not all of the respondents answered the questions 
about telemetered on-line data quantities. Of 
those who did, about 3/4 reported having on-line 
tie-line power flow data, while about half said 
they did have on-line information about some high- 
voltage line status, generator unit status and 
spinning reserve in neighboring systems. 
C. 	Responses from 6 Utilities (Medium-Sized and Very 
Large) in Europe and Japan 
Two have implemented to their satisfaction on-line 
continuous or frequent steady-state contingency 
analysis using power flow program. 
None makes any present use of distribution factors. 
Four have implemented off-line power flow programs 
for post-analysis of disturbances. 
None has implemented any on-line program for tran-
sient analysis of contingencies. 
Three utilize off-line transient analysis programs 
for post-analysis of disturbances, and four use 
these programs for system planning. 
Four use automatic printout devices for logging 
and one more plans to do so in the near future. 
Two have implemented CRT output monitors but none 
has an input/output CRT station. 
One has satisfactorily implemented a form of 
security indices. 
-- Moat on-line monitoring and display is by primary 
and secondary control computers; off-line analysis 
is performed by secondary control computers and by 
corporate computers. 
Three have definite plans to use a state estimator 
program, with bad-data rejection. They report 
measurement redundancy ratios in the range of 
1.3 to 3.0 
The replies to the questions about on-line tele- 
metering were about the same as those from the 
North American utilities. Almost all have tie-line 
telemetering, while a somewhat smaller number re-
ported having high-voltage line status, generator 
status or spinning reserve in neighboring systems. 
D. 	Summary Evs.luation of Utility Responses  
Power flow programs are well developed and widely 
used for off-line studies, but problems are re-
vealed when attempts are made to use them for on- 
line contingency analysis. The major obstacles 
probably are inadequate information about neigh- 
boring systems, and inadequate methods of pro-
ducing static reductions of external networks. 
These obstacles combine to produce highly inac-
curate results when the conditions in either the 
external or the internal network is drastically 
changed, as it is in contingency analysis. 
Transient analysis programs also are well devel- 
oped and are widely used for system planning 
studies even though their weaknesses are well 
known to most users. Only one utility reported 
successful use of an on-line transient contingen- 
cy analysis program. It is safe to state that 
this usage is outside the present state of the 
art. 
The use of distribution factors is rare, but the 
utilities which do use them are "satisfied." The 
state of the art in simulation has far surpassed 
these distribution factors, but perhaps their use-
fulness is inadequately appreciated. They provide 
"ball-park" results at low computational cost. 
Security indices are well withing the state of the 
art, conceptually, but their usefulness is not 
yet proven. 
State estimation has passed beyond the early R&D 
stage and some of the early myths about it have 
been dispelled. Still, only a few installations 
report much success. The concept is still in the 
vanguard of power system control technology. 
Bad data rejection schemes and data-protective 
systems are now well developed and are used by 
any who have provided the economic justification. 
Of the utilities planning to use state estimation 
in the near future, most prefer the method of 
weighted least squares, possibly because it is 
the easiest to understand. 
Telemetering of information from the system's 
borders and beyond is well within the state of the 
art (both analog and digital). However, economic 
and other considerations inhibit the adequate de-
velopment of inter-utility on-line data exchange 
systems. 
For large systems, the major problems of opera-
ting the high-voltage grid are dynamic and trans- 
ient stability. For medium-sized systems, the 
overwhelmingly most important problem is that of 
overloads. Other problems reported for this 
question were: 
--System security 
--Voltage and var balance 
--Area Control 
--Subsynchronous resonance 
--Loss of customer loads 
--Inadequate spinning reserve 
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SUMMARY 
The work performed under the present grant is an extension of 
the work under NSF Grant GK-37474. In the previous grant, the feasi-
bility of using Kalman filtering algorithms for two types of power 
system parameter estimation problems was demonstrated. The first  
algorithm was designed to provide estimates of network admittances 
using simulated measurements of power flows, bus voltages, loads and 
generation levels. These measurements simulated a portion of the 
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) data acquisition system. The 
second algorithm was designed to provide estimates of admittances of 
the external system equivalent network representation. Emphasis here 
was placed on information resulting from internal system switching 
operations or obtained in the scheduled or forced line additions or 
removals. The findings of this effort were reported in several 
publications (Ref. 4, 13, 33). 
In extending these findings to more practical programs, the 
following factors became significant: 
(a) Practical network sizes required the use of 
sparse matrix techniques. In this context, 
the Kalman filtering algorithms became less 
attractive since the parameter covariance 
matrix (or its inverse, the information 
matrix) became full after the second snap- 
shot of the system. 
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(b) When dealing with raw measurement data, the 
presence of large measurement errors (so-called 
bad-data) could not be avoided. Furthermore, 
it was not clear if these errors were meter or 
modeling errors. 
(c) The question of external system equivalent 
network identification was far from straight-
forward. In the first place, there was no 
assurance that the standard network reduction 
techniques used in system planning would be 
applicable in the case of system operation. 
Here the real world was being investigated 
where: 
--nonlinear effects are pronounced, 
--external system is constantly changing, 
and 
--the large number of boundary buses can 
have a strong effect on system sparsity. 
In response to factor (a) above, two approaches were adopted and 
implemented. In the first approach a suboptimal Kalman filtering scheme 
was adopted. In this scheme the sparsity of solution matrices was 
retained at the expense of some deterioration of performance. In 
the second approach, a maximum likelihood algorithm was developed. 
Here, the states are decoupled from the parameters in the information 
matrix. This resulted in a very attractive computational scheme which 
converged to the optimal solution. By decoupling the states from the 
parameters, state estimation per-se became decoupled from parameter 
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estimation in every scan over all snapshots of the system. The impli-
cation here is that, this approach is quite attractive for on-line 
implementation. 
Tests were conducted and reported (1) using the above two 
algorithms with raw data as input. It was concluded from these tests 
that significant modeling problems were present and that parameter 
estimation is a valuable tool to improve modeling accuracy. In addi-
tion, it pointed out the need for the detection and identification of 
bad data. 
This brings us to factor (b) above. It was important, in this 
case, to distinguish between large meter and large parameter errors. 
As a result, a program was developed and tested for that purpose. 
Finally, in regard to factor (c), a thorough investigation of 
steady-state network equivalencing procedures was conducted. New 
programs were developed which cope with the following problems: 
--non-sparse network equivalent 
--unknown external system 
--unreported external system outages 
Essentially, a least-squares optimization procedure is used here to 
obtain a simple and accurate network equivalent representation. 
In terms of specific contributions of the research, we can 
cite the following. 
--Demonstration of the feasibility and necessity of 
parameter estimation as it applies to on-line 
steady-state power system security assessment 
applications. 
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--Development of an efficient (storage and time-wise) 
program which can perform on-line state and parameter 
estimation using a real-time power system data base. 
--Development of a program which can construct an ex-
ternal system equivalent from internal system data. 
This program has a detection subroutine for identi-
fying unreported external system changes. 
Based on those developments, BPA is proceeding with actual im-
plementation of the state/parameter estimation program for use in its 
energy control center. As of this writing, we were unable to obtain 
actual data to test equivalencing program. This testing, however, will 
be conducted at BPA as soon as adequate data is available. 
Aside from the final tests with the external equivalents pro-
gram, we feel that all the objectives of our proposed research have 
been fulfilled. However, we do not feel that all the answers in this 
area have been obtained. Possible important questions that require 
answers are: 
(a) Design of the data base (numbers and locations of 
measurements) to provide the best results in con-
junction with a complete state/parameter estimation 
program. 
(b) Development of alternative algorithms for state/ 
parameter/bad-data detection which are competitive 
with the ones developed so far. 
(c) Study of state/parameter estimation algorithms 
from a large-scale system point of view with 
emphasis on information structures and decentra-
lized computation. 
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(d) Further investigations into the network equiva-
lents problem. One possible investigation may 
consider a nonlinear external equivalent with 
higher levels of accuracy. 
(e) Investigation of an inter-utility data base 
design whereby simplified external equivalents 
can be obtained in an on-line manner. 
PARAMETER AND STATE ESTIMATION 
1. 	INTRODUCTION  
In this section we consider the accomplishments associated with 
Task 1 of our proposal to NSF. In this task the problem of developing 
and testing a state/parameter estimation program is attacked. Emphasis 
here is placed on sparse matrix methods and their impact on a particular 
solution methodology and vice versa. Once this is resolved, the problem 
of on-line implementation poses itself. 
The main problem of on-line implementation relates to the 
theoretical modeling assumptions used in all the formulations of state 
estimation techniques. In one approach, the state estimator is tested 
with actual system data to see if it performs according to theoretical 
predictions. If it does, there is no modeling problem and the issue is 
resolved. This approach was not followed since apiori engineering 
judgement as well as previous studies (9) indicated that modeling 
problems exist to a certain extent. Hence, the approach that was 
followed consisted first, of studying the effect of modeling inaccuracy 
on state estimation performance, and second, of developing the computa-
tional tools to validate and tune the models in order to achieve ac-
ceptable performance. 
As the problem of performance acceptability is resolved, the issue 
centers on the other aspects of on-line implementation. Two primary aspects 
are treated. The first is that of the overall role of state estimation in • 
• 
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the control center. And the second is that of computational requirements. 
The modeling problem with its implications is treated in Section 2. In 
Section 3, the techniques of parameter estimation used are developed mathe-
matically and commented upon. Test results of a part of BPA's main-grid are 
presented and discussed in Section 4. And in Section 5, an integrated set of 
procedures for on-line implementation is developed and elaborated on. Con-
clusions and recommendations follow in Section 6. 
2. 	THE MODELING PROBLEM 
2.1 Sources and Extent of Modeling Inaccuracies 
Two sets of model parameters are used in state estimation. The 
first set is that of admittances in the equivalent pi-section representation 
of transmission lines and transformers. The second set corresponds to the 
statistical parameters describing measurement and sensor errors. 
Reasons for network parameter errors are several. Baumann (9) 
reports in a German study that standard formulas used to compute transmission 
line impedences contain errors to the extent of 'v5%. These can be due to 
truncation errors in the Taylor series expansion formulas. The exclusive 
use of positive-sequence impedences to represent untransposed lines and the 
neglect of mutual coupling between parallel lines can cause modeling problems. 
As for transformers, knowledge of the leakage impedences and its dependence on 
tap-settings is another problem. Certainly, aging weather, and temperature 
effects are neglected. The end result is a network model with parameter 
errors of perhaps 10% in some bad cases. 
In the case of the statistical parameters of measurement errors 
one is interested in reliable information on sensor and meter calibration 
curves. Since these are not always available, a thorough analysis of the 
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sources of sensor errors is required. Internal studies at BPA have indi-
cated that sensor errors are due primarily to two components. One is trans-
ducer bias and the other is potential and current transformer bias. The 
errors themselves are primarily bias errors in the sense that they do not 
change appreciably from one time instant to the next, or even over long 
periods of time. 
An important problem here is to distinguish between the two types 
of modeling errors. They both reflect themselves as bias-type errors. In 
our efforts and formulations below the attempt has been and will be made to 
resolve this question. 
2.2 Treatment of Modeling Problems  
The approach taken in our work relies on a three-stage approach to 
the treatment of modeling problems. 
Stage 1: Model Validity Assessment 
The Chi-Square test provides the quickest means to see if the 
overall model is sufficiently accurate. Here one looks at the function 
1 m 	(zi-h i 6c,P)) 2 
J = 	E 
where 
z A i th measurement, i=1,...,m 
i= 
X A state-vector estimate, dim [X]=n 
P A parameter vector 














v. A measurement error with zero mean and variance a. 
and 
h.(x,p)A nonlinear function relating the measured quantity z i to 
the state vector x and parameter vector p. 
The function J is chi-square distributed with m-n degrees of freedom. This 
implies that 
Eiji= mn <1. 
m (3) 
The test itself consists of computing the state estimate X and then evaluating 
J. If J is of the order of 
m-n 
 then the model is valid and state estimation 
m 
is adequate. However, ifJ>> 111-11 then a modeling problem is present. 
If a modeling problem is detected the next step is to attempt to 
pinpoint the source of the trouble. The simplest procedure is to examine 
th 
the vector of residuals r whose i component is 
(z i-h i (X,p)) 
o- . 
1 
On the average, Ir i l < 1. Hence, if Iri l>>1 then the parameters associated 
11.(x,p) are in question. These could be parameters which appear in the 
function h.(x,p), as well as, parameters of measured quantities that are 
strongly coupled with z
i
. From this one draws a candidate list of parameters 
that may be erroneous to a significant extent. 
An alternative approach to identifying erroneous parameters is the 
one proposed in Ref.14. 	 However this approach is of the "bad-data 
suppression" type which is primarily geared to detect a single highly errone,7 
pa7ameter. 
Actually two or more erroneous parameters can be detect -:J prL, dec; 





Stage 2: Checking of Individual Components 
In this stage careful analysis is undertaken to see if improve-
ments in parameter values can be obtained. This is a stage of directly 
"measuring" individual parameters. The easiest parameters to check here are 
those of measurement errors. Suspected meters can be field-tested and cali-
, -.:ated in a rather routine manner. Next, one considers transformer parameters 
with special emphasis on leakage impedences, tap settings at both sides of the 
transformer and the effect of tap settings on leakage impedences. This can 
be best achieved through a careful evaluation of manufacturers design and test 
data. Direct tests on installed transformers cannot be ruled out especially 
when serious anomalies are still present in the model. As for transmission 
line data, the cases to watch for are those of parallel lines with mutual 
coupling. Otherwise, little can be done other than to check the accuracy of 
calculations provided in the data book. 
Stage 3: Parameter Estimation 
Parameter estimation provides the means to improve on the accuracy 
of the system models using masses of actual system data over representative 
operating conditions. It represents an important tuning process which ascer- . 
ains the statistical validity of the models used over a wide range of opera-
.ing conditions. In our assessment, this has the following advantages: 
a. For on-line state estimation, the estimated and 
measured quantities will correspond closely to 
each other within the statistical accuracy of 
measuring instruments. This is essential to 
develop operator or dispatcher confidence in 
state estimation calculations and predictions. 
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b. Bad-data rejection and identification will be- 
come much easier to perform. As will be shown 
later, modeling errors can seriously degrade state 
estimator performance. This can cause the bad- 
data detection algorithm to be almost useless. 
-provements on some network models can be achieve.. 
These can now be used in the applications or plan-
ning programs. 
d. Once the software is developed, parameter estimation 
can become a routine function requiring only little 
man-hour effort and some computer time. 
2.3 Sensitivity Analysis  
Through sensitivity analysis one can determine those parameters 
which can cause serious errors in state estimation calculations. This can 
provide a further refinement over the results obtained in model validity 
assessments, thus limiting the set of parameters to be estimated. 
Mathematical derivations of sensitivity analysis formulas sh4-,wir2 
sensitivity of state estimates to various sets of parameters are avall.to e 
in several references and will not be attempted here.
(11) 
 Instead, by means 
of a simple illustrative example, the contribution of parameter errors to 
the overall error in a given measurement is computed. 
Denoting by Ap the expected error in the parameter vector one 
can write 









 represents a bias-type error which is added to metering 
(5) 
11 
error v. In the example chosen we consider a pi-section representation of a 
line or a transformer as shown in figure 1. 
8. = 0 	 e j = .1 radian 














Fig. 1: Pi-Section Representation of a Typical Network Element 
In the case of a transmission line, the following typical values are 
selected: 
B = 100 pu 





= .01 pu. 
For the case where 0 .1 =.1r and parameter errors are 5% of nominal values one 
obtains: 
T. 
AB1-CI-/ .5 p.u. 
6B 
aT„ 









.--L1-) .5 x 10-2 p.u. 
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= .5 x 10
-3 
where T ij and u ij are the real and reactive flows from bus i to bus j 
respectively. 
In the case of a transformer the following values are selected: 
B = 100 p.u. 
C = 0.0 
E = Tap Ratio = 1.0. 
Assuming e, = .1r and 5% parameter errors one obtains: 
6T 
Bi 	ABi 1) .5 p.u. 
6BAB1 = .25 x 10 -3p.u. 
= 5p.u. 
The conclusions of the above results are 
For transmission lines the sensitivity of real-
flow to line susceptance errors is at least c‘io 
orders of magnitude larger than the sensitivity 
to errors in all other parameters. 
b. If the measurement error standard deviation ha., 
the reasonable value of .1 p.u., then the error 
due to line susceptance is five standard devia-
tions which is quite unacceptable. 
c. In the case of transformers, sensitivity to 
an error in tap positions is at least an order 
13 
of magnitude larger than that with respect to 
leakage susceptance. 
Therefore, the order of priority in estimating network parameters 
should be: 
1. Tap settings of transformers 
2. Line susceptance for transmission lines or leakage 
susceptance of transformers 
3. (Possibly) line conductance of transmission lines. 
All other parameter errors can be reasonably neglected. 
The above results are consistent with findings in Ref.(11) and also 
with our own simulations as will be discussed later in the report. (For 
detailed derivation of all sensitivity relations refer to Appendix A) 
3. PARAMETER ESTIMATION  
3.1 Problem Formulation 
Denoting by z(k) the vector of measurements at time sample k, k=1,... 
N, one can write 
z(k) = h(x(k),p) + v(k); k=1,...,N 	 (6) 
where 
x(k) A state vector with dimension n 
p A parameter vector with dimension e 
v(k) A error in z(k) with zero mean and diagonal covariance 
matrix R(k). 
Given value of the parameter vector is denoted by p° . This can be related 
to the true (but unknown) parameter vector p by 
p° = P + w 
	
( 7 ) 
where w represents the error in the knowledge of p and is modeled as a zero-
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 type algorithm. 
computing 
E i 
t. ,,n+1 	An+1p and x 	(n+1) can be accomplished 
For simplicity let P i and Xi 
^n+1 	̂n+1 
p 	and x 	(n+1), then this algorithm 
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via a 
represent the 
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E i  = 
(Ck)T R-1 (k)H 
Denoting by X(k) and P the weighted least squares estimates of 
x(k) and p, k=1,...,N, then by definition X(k) and P should minimize 
N 
J =E [(z(k)-h(x(k),P) TR
-1 
 (k)(z(k)-h(X(k),P)] + (p 0-P)M-1 (po-13). 	( 8) 
k=1 
3.2 Solution Methods  
(a) Suboptimal Kalman Filter Approach 
In this state and parameter estimates are updated with every new 
n 	
p
n ^ ^ 
snap-shot measurement vector z(k). Let x (n) and 	be the estimates of 
X(n) and P at the minimum of 
n 
j = (po_,014-1(po4 )+ E (z(k)
-h(X(i),P) TR 1 (i)(z(i) -h(X(i),P)) 
i=1 
A 	 ,,n+1
(n+1) Also let Mn 
be the covariance of p
n 
x then, it can be shown that  
^n+1 
and p 	will minimize. 
^n ^n+1 -1 ^n+1 
	
n+1 = (P - P 	)Mn CP - P 	) 
An+1 	̂n+1 -1 + (z(n+1)-h(x (n+1), p 	)R (n+1)(z(n+1)- 
An+1 	An+1 
h(x (n+1), p 	)). 
(9)  
(10)  








A E M n+1 = pp 
i = 0,1,2,... 
(b) Decoupled State Parameter Approach 
Minimization of J as expressed in Eq. (8) requires that at the 
solution 1(k) and 13 be zero i.e. 
	
,1 	T 
0 = (k) = -2HkR
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Gk = 6111 
K 	613 X(k),$' 
In the decoupled approach one preceeds according to the following 
steps: 
Step 1: By holding P to be constant solve for 1(k) using 
Eq. (9). This can be accomplished by means of the state estimation interative 
algorithm 
li+1 (k) = 1i (k) + [(HO TR-1 (x)It -1 (4- ) TR-1 (z(k) -h(xi (k),P) 
	
(14) 
where i=1,2,..., and 
14-c. 	61t13) Y- (k),$ 




P iteratively according to Eq. (10) by means of the algorithm 
Ai+1 	Ai 	i T -1 	i 
	1)-1 
 -1 o Ai 














A 	Ai x(k),p 
The summation terms in Eq.(12) are obtained sequentially during step 1. This 
implies that only one iteration can be used in Eq. (15). 
i+1 lA 	A 
Step 3: If 1p -p
il
<E, where E is a given positive constant, 
then the process is stopped. Otherwise, go back to Step 1 with the new 
parameter values. 
If convergence occurs the necessary minimization conditions
(12) and (13) 
are 
obviously satisfied. Due to the nonlinearity of the equations, there is no 
guarantee that the global minimum is attained. However, by calculating the 
chi-square performance index J given in the previous section, one can de-
termine if a statistically acceptable solution has been obtained, In addition, 
engineering judgement as to the reasonableness of solutions can be exercised 
in order to make sure that adequate answers are obtained. 
3.3 Parameter Estimation Programs  
Two parameter estimation programs were developed during the summer 
of 1974 corresponding to the two approaches discussed above. With a few 
minor modifications the programs can be considered of the production type. 
Both programs are written for BPA's CDC-6400 computer using Fortran IV. In 
both cases sparsity techniques are employed to minimize the amount of com-
puter core storage and to increase computational speeds. 
The use of sparsity techniques poses no difficulties in the de-
coupled approach. However, for the recursive approach the matrix M n and its 
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inverse become full following the first snapshot. As a result an approximation 
is used whereby Mn is diagonalized at the end of every snapshot computation. 
This is the main reason the Kalman Filter approach is called suboptimal. 
4. 	INITIAL TEST RESULTS  
4.1 Introduction 
During the summer of 1973 a limited number of computer simulations 
were conducted to study the issue of inaccurate modeling and the feasibility 
of parameter estimation. Results of this effort are provided in a technical 
(4 ) 
paper. 	In that paper two rather significant conclusions were obtained. 
First, inaccuracies in the network parameter models of the order of 5-10% 
can cause significant statistical degradation in state estimator performance. 
And second, these inaccuracies can be corrected for by means of parameter 
estimation leading to state estimator performance which is almost indistinguish-
able from that where a perfect model is used. 
The above conclusions, however, were based on computer simulations 
and not on an actual system. Furthermore, parameter errors were introduced in 
a limited number of parameters. The limitation was mainly due to the fact 
that sparsity techniques were not implemented at that time. As soon as 
sparsity techniques were implemented in the summer of 1974, simulation tests 
were conducted whereby all network parameters contained a certain amount of 
error. Following that in November of 1974 data from eight remote stations of 
BPA's SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system became available. 
This made it possible, for the first time, to test state estimation at BPA 
using adequate and reliable data. It is recalled here, that an earlier test 
in 1970 was made. However, at that time, SCADA was not in operation and many 
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inadequacies in the data were present. Furthermore, parameter estimation 
programs were not available to improve on the network model. 
In the following discussion, results of simulations as well as 
tests using actual system data are presented. 
4.2 Simulation Results of Parameter Estimation Programs  
The use of sparsity techniques in the parameter estimation programs 
permitted more realistic simulation tests whereby all network parameters were 
inaccurate to a certain degree. Here, a Gaussian random number generator 
was used to introduce errors in each parameter p i , i=1,...t. The error had 
amean.ofzeroandastandarddeviationofa i lpi kwhereu.ranged from 0.02 
to 0.1 for a particular test case. For the results shown below a i=0.05 for 
alltransmissionlineadmittancetermsandu.=0.02 for transformer tap ratios. 
The initial parameter covariance matrix M
o 
was diagonal with the i
th 
diagonal 
term given by: 
2 	' 
(M 	=a il  P- I 
2 
o  
The network chosen for simulations is the same one used in Ref. (4 ) 
It is representative of a portion of BPA's main grid network and associated 
data acquisition system. 
In Figure (2), performance of the Kalman Filter algorithm is shown 
(dashed line). In the test simulated here, all transmission line parameters 
were randomly perturbed using a Gaussian random number generator. The errors 
had a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 5% of nominal value. As for trans-
formers, a 2% random error was introduced in the tap ratios. For the first four 
time samples, no parameter estimation was attempted. These samples were used 
primarily to determine the set of parameters that should be estimated. The 
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decision on which parameter to estimate was based on the analysis of residuals 
of line-flow measurements. Basically, if the residual of the real or reactive 
measurement became greater than 3 then the•line susceptance and shunt capaci-
tance are included in the candidate set. In the case of transformers, tap 
were included automatically. The use of several time samples (in this 
cas, four of them) to decide on the candidate parameter set tended to make 
this set slightly larger than the case of basing the candidate list on one 
sample. The idea here is to exclude any parameters to which the performance 
index is insensitive and include as many parameters otherwise. This process 
normally did eliminate most of the radial portions of the network from considera-
tion. And this is an expected result. 
Starting with the fifth time sample, the parameter estimator was 
turned on. It is clear from Figure (2) that system performance immediately 
improves from values of the order 14-13 to values of the order of .6-.7. 
The improvement is attained at the first time sample parameter estimation is 
pe_cormed. However, this does not mean that the parameters become all accurate 
vLer one time sample. Parameter estimation at different operating conditions 
will continuously tend to improve the accuracy of parameter estimates. 
Performance of the Decoupled State-Parameter algorithm is shown in 
Figure (3). The performance at the last time sample (10 samples were used) 
is plotted as a function of major loop iterations. Here all the line sus- 
ceptances and shunt capacitances, as well as, transformer ratios were estimated. 
After four iterations, the performance changed from a value of 14.0 to 0.52. 
This performance is slightly better than that of the Kalman Filter approach. 
4.3 Experimental Tests Using Actual Data  
4.3.1 Experimental Setup  
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It consisted of three 10 minute scans. Each scan consisted of 40 snapshots 
taken at 15 second intervals. One scan was conducted at noon time, the 
second at 7:00 p.m., and the third around midnight in order to observe the 
system at widely different operating conditions. It was readily noted that 
during each of the 10 minute periods the system operating conditions hardly 
changed. Hence, only five snapshots were retained for each of the three time 
periods. 
At the time of conducting experimental tests, data from 8 remote 
stations became available. The network monitored by these stations is shown 
in Figure 4. It consists of 17 busses and 34 branches. 66 measurement 
quantities were transmitted every 15 seconds during a 10 minute interval upon 
request from the operator. Network status (or configuration) was determined 
directly from station diagrams displayed to the operator. In the actual on-
line system, network configuration will be determined directly from status 
readings by SCADA I. 
The 66 measurements mentioned consist of a mix of 12 voltage (KV), 
21 real and 17 reactive line flow (MW and MVAR) measurements and 9 real and 7 
reactive injection measurements. Transformer tap settings were also monitored. 
There are approximately twice as many measurements as there are state variables. 
This two-to-one redundancy is fairly evenly distributed over the entire system 
providing considerable back-up in cases of lost measurements due to various 
types of failures. 
In testing the various components of SCADA I hardware very careful 
attention was given to the calibration of measurement instrumentation. From 
our point of view, it was crucial to know fairly accurately the expected 
errors in the various measurements. The BPA staff on their part, conducted in-
dependent tests to see if tranducers satisfy the required specifications under 
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a variety of conditions. And after looking at calibration curves and 







where z is a MW or MVAR measurement and a
z
2 
 is the corresponding error 




= .005x(full scale). 	 (17) 
From a sensitivity analysis point of view, the state estimates, where the 
model is exactly known, are quite insensitive to errors in the measurement 
covariance matrix. This is not true, however, when parameter estimation is 
_:tempted. A measurement covariance matrix with diagonal entries considerably 
smaller than corresponding true values will weigh the measurements too heavily 
causing significant model changes. Alternatively, variances which are greater 
-Lan true values will tend to improve the model slightly causing no significant 
ir?rovement in the state estimation process. 
Preliminary checks on measurement accuracies were conducted prior 
to testing using the state and parameter estimation programs. One such check 
is shown in Table I whereby the injection measurement is subtracted from the 
sum of line flow measurements, around a given bus. The resulting error is 
compared with the cumulative a defined by 
= 	2INJ + 2 °. F2LOW11/2. 
	 (18) 
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TABLE I: Preliminary Evaluation of Expected 
Errors in MW and MVAR Measurements 
BUS QUANTITY EFLOW-INJ. a 	 ERROR 
KEELR2 MW 4.6 MW 10.56 	 .434 
BONN2 MW 11.3 MW 7.3 	 1.57 
KEELR2 MVAR 3.32 MVAR 8.1 .40 
OCTY1 MW 0.9 1.7 .53 
It is cl.r: from this table that our choice of a values is reasonable. This 
metnoL of checking did point out some inconsistencies. For example, we were 
able to determine that the reactive injection measurement at BONN2 needed re-
c_libration. This measurement was not included for estimation purposes. It 
also pointed out errors in scale-factor conversion coefficients used to trans-
:ate digital octal readings to MW, MVAR or KV quantities. It is, however, 
limited to those cases where all flows and injections are measured at a bus. 
4.3.2 Comparison with Simulations  
Figures (2) and (3) contain results of both parameter estimation 
app..o .ches using actual as well as simulated data. In both cases parameter 
Etimation significantly improves performance. 
As will be discussed later, the experiments indicated that trans-
former data contained errors primarily in the series leakage susceptance as 
well as the tap setting at the fixed end. (The variable end was directly 
monitored.) Due to time limitations, only the decoupled algorithm was 
upgraded to perform the estimation of these parameters. The earlier version 
of the algorithm attempted the estimation of tap ratios only at transformer 
branches. 
It is clear from Figure (3), that simulated and actual results 
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-,:oout a general level of network parameter inaccuracy of 5-10%. 
In Figure (2), the actual results were obtained after deleting all 
react -...ve measurements at the transformer banks. This caused the sensitivity 
of the performance index to transformer parameter errors to be small. Un-
fortunately, time did not permit to upgrade this algorithm to estimate trans- 
former leakage susceptance and the tap at the fixed end. The algorithm, however, 
die estimate transmission line series susceptances and shunt capacitances. The 
performance improved from a value of 4.5 to .8-1.4. 
For the remainder of the report, all results pertain to the decoupled 
State-Parameter Algorithm. 
4.3.3 Overall Performance  
The performance index defined in Eq. (1) is plotted as a function 
of time samples before and after performing parameter estimation as shown in 
Figure (5). Two aspects can be noted here. First, an improvement in perfor-
mance of at least one order of magnitude is observed due to parameter estima- 
tion. The second is that a slight reduction in measurement errors is observed 
as loading conditions decrease in magnitude from noon to evening and then to 
midnight. This demonstrates the assumption that measurement errors generally 
increase with increasing load conditions. It is noted that the formulas for 
measurement variances given in Eqs. (12) and (13) were used only for the 
first time sample and then the variances were held constant. A variable a 
for each time sample would, most probably, yield a fairly constant performance 
index. 
Figure (6) shows the histograms of normalized residuals r i defined 
as: 
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z. - h.(X,P) 
r =  	i=1,...,M. 
i 
It is clear from this figure that all the large errors which are statistically 
unacceptable have been eliminated by the parameter estimation process. Further-
more the distribution of errors following parameter estimation is approximately 
Gaussian. It is felt that this is an interesting result which justifies to a 
good extent, The Gaussian assumption about measurement noise. 
4.3.4. 	Transmission Line Parameters  
The parameter estimation program attempted the estimation of line 
susceptances only. From a sensitivity analysis point of view it can be shown 
that small errors in line conductances and shunt capacitances are of little 
consequence. This was confirmed by simulation tests whereby very minor per-
formance degradation was observed due to these parameters. 
Table II shows the initial and final values of transmission line 
susceptances. Changes greater than 10% in these values occured in 4 of the 
14 lines shown. A change of 38.1% was observed on the last line in the list. 
Comparison of measured with estimated flows, both before and after parameter 
estimation, is provided in Figure (7). As can be expected, parameter estimation 
does the job of reducing the values of the residuals. 
4.3.5 Transformer Parameters  
In the case of transformers several modifications to our prior 
assessments had to be made. In Ref. (4 ) it was advocated that transformer 
tap settings should be estimated. No attempt was made to estimate leakage 
susceptances. After considerable evaluation of results it was concluded that 
it is more meaningful to estimate a) transformer leakage susceptance and 
b) the fixed tap settings which are constant. The variable tap settings are 
directly measured. 
TABLE II: Comparison of Given and Estimated Suscep-
tances (B) of all Transmission Lines 
LINE GIVEN B ESTIMATED 
13 
DIFFERENCE %DIFFERENCE 
BONN2-ROSS2 17.7648 18.1002 .3354 1.91% 
BONN2-TRO T 29.9539 30.1022 .1482 .443% 
0 CTY9-KEELR9 199.8990 228.1128 28.2137 12.65% 
BONN2-TROUT2 22.5949 22.1232 -.4717 -2.14% 
RIVGT2-ROSS2 107.8550 127.4719 19.6169 15.30% 
ROSS2-TRO T 42.8996 40.1044 -2.7953 -7.22% 
TROUT2 TRO T 92.1934 90.7880 -1.4053 -1.53% 
ROSS2-ALCOA2 160.6944 159.9392 -.7553 -.47% 
OSTRN9-0 CTY9 178.7614 212.7244 33.9631 15.9% 
ST JN2-ROSS2 89.0228 88.7825 -.2404 -.27% 
TROUT9-0STRN9 195.1089 195.0905 -.0184 -.01% 
KEELR2-RIVGT2 66.6669 61.6149 -5.052 -8.2% 
KEELR1-0 CTY1 7.4684 6.8251 -.6432 -9.45% 
KEELR1-ST JN1 14.7558 23.8421 9.0683 38.1% 
TABLE III: Comparison of Given and Estimated Trans-
former Series Admittances (B) of all 
Transformers 
TRANSFORMER GIVEN B ESTIMATED 
B 
DIFFERENCE %DIFFERENCE 
TROUT9-TROUT2 83.6854 83.6776 .0078 .009% 
ROSS1-ROSS2(1) 33.3146 37.4421 4.13 11.02% 
ROSS1-ROSS2(2) 33.7209 36.7527 3.032 8.25% 
ALCOAI-ALCOA2 34.5639 34.4084 -.1555 -.452% 
KEELR9-KEELR2 87.7133 92.1847 4.47 4.85% 
ST JN2-ST JN1 38.0219 37.93 4.47 4.58% 
KEELR2-KEELR1(1) 37.3351 42.8753 -.092 -.242% 
KEELR2-KEELR1(2) 38.2457 37.5748 -.671 -1.78% 
TABLE IV: Comparison of Given and Estimated Trans-






TROUT9-TROUT2 .9762 .9762 0.0 0.0 
ROSS1-ROSS2(1) 1.0122 1.0066 -.0056 -.55% 
ROSS1-ROSS2(2) 1.000 1.0061 .0061 -.60% 
ALCOAl-ALCOA2 .9756 .9758 .0002 .02% 
KEELR9-KEELR2 .9762 .9741 -.0021 -.22% 
ST JN2-ST JN1 .9685 .9687 ,0002 .02% 
KEELR2-KEELR1(1) 1.050 1.0037 -.0436 -4.3% 
KEELR2-KEELR1(2) 1.025 1.0038 -.0212 -2.1% 
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Tables III and IV compare initial and final values of transformer 
susceptances and tap ratios respectively. Figure (8) provides comparisons 
of measured vs estimated flows at various transformers. Some fairly serious 
discrepencies can be observed at the ROSS1-ROSS2 and KEELR1-KEELR2 transformer 
banks. 
4.3.6 Discussion of Results  
Based on the above results and also the mass of information acquired 
during the testing period, it can be safely concluded that our prior suspicions 
regarding the network modeling problem were justified. This could not be more 
true then in the case of transformers. By deleting the reactive flows at the 
transformers banks from the estimation process, the estimates of these flows 
have errors of approximately several hundred MVAR's. In Fig. (8) the error is 
still over 100 MVAR's although these measurements were included in the estima-
tion process. 
In the case of transmission lines the case of 38.1% error seems to 
be amomalous. However, the other errors seem to be within theoretical predic-
tions. 
The main result of the above tests, we feel, is that we have a good 
tool to work with to simultaneously improve the accuracy of network parameters 
and identify sources of discrepancy in the model. 
5. 	PROCEDURES FOR ON-LINE IMPLEMENTATION 
5.1 Implementation Phases and Requirements  
Successful implementation of BPA's on-line state estimator will 
depend on several software developments and the coordination of several 
activities. The primary activities involved are: 
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a. Implementation of all software associated with 
the Sequential State Estimator, 
b. Implementation of parameter estimation software, 
c. Evaluation of operator requirements and confidence 
in state estimation, 
d. Evaluation of scheduling requirements of performing 
state estimation based on collected system-wide data, 
and 
e. Tuning of all kinds of relevant parameters prior to 
commissioning of the on-line estimator. 
Remaining portions of the overall package contain subroutines 
for the detection and diagnosis of bad data. Full implementation and 
testing of these has not been performed yet. 
Finally, programs which generate network configuration from SCADA 
outputs are yet to be fully developed and completed. This is a fairly 
difficult and obviously crucial program. It is essential that it becomes 
available as soon as possible. 
5.2 	Parameter Estimation  
The two parameter estimation programs which have been developed 
are compatible with the state estimation package. In essence they use 
the same inputs and produce the same outputs except for outputs on 
network admittance parameters. Further refinements in these programs 
are necessary. These are: 
(a) Program cleanup which requires deletion of some 
unnecessary subroutines 
(b) Increase in capability to handle large networks. 
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This may involve some extended core storage 
programming 
(c) Implementation of a better bus/parameter 
ordering scheme 
(d) Detailed program documentation 
A by-product of the parameter estimation program is the weighted 
least squares estimation program using sparsity techniques. Any impro-
vements on the parameter estimation package will automatically apply to 
this program. 
	
5.3 	Operator Requirements  
During the full-scale testing period, serious effort should be 
associated with overall operator requirements from the points of view of 
(a) Display requirements 
(b) Understanding of the estimation program, and 
(c) Developing his confidence in the results. 
All of these items are interrelated since a good deal of inter-
action, his confidence in the estimation process will, hopefull, grow. 
5.4 Frequency of Updates  
Studies which use actual system-wide data should be performed 
to determine the required frequency of updating the state estimates. 
These studies should be based on the following requirements: 
(a) Operator display 
(b) Bus-load forecasting 
(c) Security monitor, and 
(d) Voltage scheduling. 
The objective should be to satisfy all these requirements while 
minimizing computer time requirements. It is hoped that this will 
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considerably reduce computational time requirements of state estimation. 
The data obtained during the study period indicated the changes in system 
operating conditions are very small even over a range of ten minutes. 
However, this may be characteristic only of the particular area monitored. 
Not enough information was available for system-wide assessment over a 
day or so. 
The approach which we proposed contemplated using information 
about the time behavior of bus loads and generations. And by means of a 
simple prediction scheme (simplified bus-load forecaster) the decision 
is made when the next state estimate is necessary. This would make the 
process of when to compute state estimates adaptive. The predictor will 
determine also when to attempt security assessment next. Hence, there 
are overall savings in computer time for both state estimation and the 
rest of the applications programs. 
Alternatively, however, display and bus-load forecasting require-
ments are better satisfied with periodic state estimator updates. Hence, 
an optimum solution should be reached which takes into account all of 
the above factors. 
5.5 	Testing and Tuning  
Prior to final commissioning of the on-line estimator many of the 
tests conducted so far and others should be performed on a system-wide 
and thorough basis. These will consist of: 
(a) Very careful calibration of instrumentation and 
testing of any discrepancies arising in the 
metering process. 
(b) Evaluation of any inadequacies in the network 
configuration which is based on status infor- 
mation. 
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(c) Careful checking of network models with special 
emphasis on transformers, status of capacitor 
banks, and all the required model changes due 
to status changes (e.g. 3-winding transformers). 
(d) Testing of statistical model validity without 
attempting any parameter estimation. 
(e) Tuning of network models by means of parameter 
estimation. 
(f) Examination, through field tests, analysis of 
data, discussions with operators, etc. of any 
serious discrepancies in the network models 
which might arise following parameter estimation. 
(g) Tuning of the sequential state estimator using 
all the validated models. 
5.6 	Conclusions and Recommendations  
The basic conclusions of the present study are: 
(a) Modeling problems do exist as far as network 
parameters are concerned. 
(b) These problems cause the state estimator to 
provide fairly unreliable results whereby 
considerable discrepancies between some 
measured and estimated quantities exist. 
(c) Parameter estimation can clean-up the 
network parameter models leading to 
statistically acceptable results. 
(d) There is still a significant role for field 
tests and engineering judgement in the 
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modeling area. This should be exercised. Para-
meter estimation can easily pinpoint the areas of 
possible trouble and discrepancies. 
(e) Improved tuning procedures for the sequential 
state estimator were developed and implemented. 
In my recommendations for future developments, the following 
items are stressed: 
(a) The final stages of software development as 
described in the previous section should be 
undertaken with speed to insure early state 
estimator implementation. 
(b) Closer interaction among analysts, system 
operators, and programmers will be required 
to insure a proper understanding of the 
whole process and to develop the required 
confidence in it. 
(c) The immediate next step will be the model 
validation of all parameters associated 
with security monitoring. The present NSF 
supported work (with BPA's endorsement) is 
quite significant in developing the basic 
concepts. These will have to be tested for 
feasibility from the practical point of view. 
It is hoped that as a result of concerted 
effort a valid security monitor will result. 
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IDENTIFICATION OF 
EXTERNAL NETWORK EQUIVALENTS 
1. 	BACKGROUND  
In recent years advanced techniques (21-23) have been imple-
mented to assure a secure electric power service under all conditions 
of operation. The system operator is concerned with different in-
equality constraints (frequency drops, overloading of lines, etc.) 
and with equality constraints (generation meets the demand). 
The conditions of operation of a power system may be 
categorized into three basic states: 
(1) Normal state 
(2) Emergency state 
(3) Restorative state 
In the Normal state, all system equality and inequality con-
straints are satisfied. In the Emergency state, some of the inequality 
constraints are violated. In the Restorative state some of the equality 
constraints are violated. 
The Normal state can be decomposed into two states: 
(1) Secure Normal State 
(2) Insecure Normal State 
A Secure Normal state is a Normal state where single system con-
tingencies like the loss of aline or a generator will not cause departure 
from the Normal state. An Insecure Normal state is a Normal state where 
single system contingencies can cause a departure to an emergency state. 












FIG. 8. Interactions Among Power System Operating States 
The primary concern of the system operator is to keep the opera-
ting condition of the power system in the Normal state to ensure service 
continuity at standard frequency and voltage. The operator should con-
tinuously test the capability of the power system to withstand postu-
lated next contingencies in order to judge its level of vulnerability. 
If the contingency analysis indicates that the system is in Secure Normal 
state, no control action is needed. If, however, the contingency 
analysis indicates that the system is in Insecure Normal state, pre-
ventive control action should be taken to bring the system in Secure 
Normal state in the most economical way. This preventive control 
action may involve shifting of generation schedules, switching opera-
tions, start-up of units or changing the scheduled exchange of power 
with neighboring systems. 
The above introduction shows the importance of the contingency 
analysis in the security assessment of power systems. 
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Contingency analysis involves the solution of a load flow 
problem once for each contingency. The process involves two steps: 
(a) Computation of a load flow solution of the 
present operating condition of the system 
using on-line state estimation.(15) 
(b) Computation of the load flow solution of 
the system for the various single line 
or generator outages.(24-26) 
Interconnections with neighboring systems considerably influence 
the redistribution of network power flows and voltage levels after 
outages take place. Therefore step (b) above requires the knowledge 
of the precontingency load flow solution of the neighboring system. 
Since this is difficult to achieve at present, an equivalent repre-
sentation of the neighboring (external) system becomes necessary. 
The existing approaches to obtain the equivalent representation 
of the external system can be classified into two categories. 
(1) Norton-type equivalents: To obtain a Norton- 
type equivalent knowledge of the topology and 
network parameters of the external system is 
necessary. 
(2) On-line type equivalents: On-line type equiva-
lents assume no knowledge about the external 
system and they use information from the in- 
ternal system only to obtain the equivalent 
representation of the external system. 
We should emphasize that equivalence techniques are apllied also 
for planning purposes but for different reasons than for on-line security 
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assessment. On planning the primary purpose of the network reduction 
is to avoid the computational burden of solving the load flow for the 
entire area. 
2. 	AVAILABLE METHODS  
In any network equivalencing problem the overall area is divided 
into an internal system and an external system as it is shown in Figure 
9. Some buses of the internal system are connected to the external 
system. These buses are called the boundary buses. 
Boundary Buses 
FIG. 9. Decomposition of System in Internal 
and External Parts 
The entire system nodal matrix equation is 
YV = I 	 (19) 
where I, V are the vectors of injected bus currents and bus voltages 
respectively and Y is the system's nodal admittance matrix. The 
vectors I, V, and the matrix Y can be written as: 
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Elimination of yE from Equation (3) yields: 
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This is the equivalent nodal matrix equation for the internal 
system. If the equivalent nodal admittance matrix is known, together 
with the boundary and internal bus voltages, one can easily evaluate 
the equivalent injected currents from Equation (22). If these currents 
do not change following an internal network change, then network 
outage contingencies can be solved exactly. 
The trouble here is that the equations describing the system are 
4 
	 not those of Equation (19) but rather the load flow equations which are 
non linear. They consist of: 
(a) Two equations per load bus, one for real 







(b) One equation per generation bus for real power. 
Voltage magnitudes for generating buses are 
fixed and known. 
(c) No equations for slack bus where the voltage 
magnitude is known and the phase angle is 
fixed arbitrarily at zero. 
In most of the approaches given in the literature the following 
steps are taken. 
(a) Define the boundaries of the internal system. 
(b) Reduce by means of Norton equivalent the ex-
ternal system to the boundary. 
(c) Classify the boundary buses as generation 
buses or as load buses. 
In reference (27) the internal system is augmented by a buffer 
zone as it is shown in Figure 10. 
FIG. 10. Augmentation of Internal System 
by Means of a Buffer Zone 
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This buffer zone includes: 
(1) Buses of the external system critical to the 
accuracy of the equivalent. 
(2) Components of the external system of which 
the operational limitations may be violated 
due to disturbances in the internal system 
(weak links). 
(3) Generation buses of the external system 
which control the operating conditions in 
the internal system (controlling buses). 
The weak links are found by imposing extreme stressing conditions 
in the internal system. Since an unobservable part of the external 
system is included in the equivalent, several simplifications and 
assumptions are needed which jeopardize the accuracy of the equivalent 
system. 
In reference (28) some buses of the external system are in-
cluded in order to preserve sparsity in the equivalent representation. 
Simulation studies on power systems, however, have shown that the problem 
of sparse structure is not so crucial. Even if the number of the 
equivalent branches is extremely large, a portion of them may be 
eliminated by using a technique proposed in reference (29) or by a 
simpler method as we will propose later without significant sacrifice 
of the accuracy. 
In reference (29) the boundary buses are assumed to be load 
buses; therefore, many of the equivalent branches between the boundary 










 are known, the vector 
HP = P - G8 
—E —B 	—B 





is the impedance of the equivalent branch ij and 
ZT,ij 
is 
the corresponding transfer impedance given by the rest of the network. 
If 
E,ij  
> C 	 (23) 
T,ij 
where C is a predetermined value, the branch ij is eliminated from the 
equivalent representation. 
In references (30) and (31) two approaches are suggested. The 
first is a Norton-type equivalent where the boundary buses are treated 
as generation buses. The other is based on DC approximation of the 
external system. If P
—B 







Elimination of the vector 6
E 
yields 
























or by taking into consideration the linear approximation for the 
external system 
P (0,V) + HE
E + G2B = 0 
Or 
-HP = P (6,V) + GO 
E —B — 	—B 
Equations (27), (28), and (29) are the load flow equations. The boundary 




In reference (32) a model based on DC analysis is suggested. 
Deviations from the operating point are used to provide the necessary 
information for the equivalent representation. The statement of the 
method is: 
The system between the boundary buses is modeled as 
Z = Hu + v (31) 
where: 
Z - is the vector of the phase angles of the boundary buses 
H - is the unknown boundary impedance matrix 
u - is the vector of real powers which depend upon the 
topology and real injections of the internal system 
v - is the vector which depends upon the topology and 
real injections of the external system. 
Z(n) = Zit
n+1
) - Z(t ) 
— n 
u(n) = u(tn+1 ) - u(t 
n
) 
— — 	—  
v(n) = v(tn+1 ) - v(t 
n
) 
— — 	—  
Z(n) = Hu(n) + v(n) 









). Furthermore, u(n) and v(n) are 
uncorrelated. The problem is to estimate H and R by using Z(n), 






Least squares estimation yields 
-1 
H = [ y Z(n)uT (n)][ X u(n)uT  (n)] 
n=1 	 n=1 
N 
 




provided that the inverse of 
L u(n)uT (n) 
n=1 
exists. 
Objections to this approach are: 
(1) Since the entire system for a time period is 
moving in the same direction, v(n) have an 
expected value different than zero. 
(2) u(n), v(n) are not uncorrelated since both 
depend upon the power injections. 
(3) The accuracy of the DC model does not 
suffice for this problem. 
In reference (33) information from outages in the internal system 




are pre and post 
outage internal system measurement vectors, then 
Z
1 




























is assumed that the boundary buses have been classified as load or as 
generation buses. For contingency analysis, the real power and voltage 
magnitudes at generation buses and the real and reactive powers at load 
buses are assumed to be constant. All these quantities define the 




denote the pre and post outage cases, then 
1 	2 3 
C = C + v 
where v
3 
is a random vector of zero mean and covariance R3 , and 
1 	1 1 








p is the vector of external network equivalent parameters, with initial 
0 
value E and a priori covariance error matrix M0 . 
0 
Equations (37), (38), and (39) are combined to give: 
F
3 


















 , x 2 , and p are those which minimize the index: 































































3. 	PROBLEM DESCRIPTION  
3.1 	Introduction  
Given a power system which is observable to a state estimator 
and an external system connected, find an equivalent representation of 
the external system which will satisfy the following objectives: 
(1) It is accurate, in the sense, that it should 
reproduce the true power flows and voltage 
levels for contingency analysis. 
(2) It accounts for unreported changes in the 
external system. 
The second objective needs some clarification. Two kinds of unreported 
changes may occur: 
(a) Transmission line outages 
(b) Generator outages 
To account for these changes means either the equivalent is insensitive 
to these changes or it is sensitive, in which case, they should be 
detected and the equivalent must be modified. 
In our investigation, we sought to optimize the equivalent 
representation of the external system for the following cases: 
(a) The topology and the parameter values of the 
external network are well defined. 
(b) No information about the external system is known. 
The general problem will be investigated by examining four 
simpler subproblems. 
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Subproblem 1  
 
Given: Complete information for the internal 
system. Topology and parameter values 
of the external system. 
Equivalent representation such that 
contingency analysis will be accurate. 
Find: 
 
Subproblem 2  
Given: 	 Complete information for the internal 
system. Topology and parameter values 
of the external system. 
Find: 	 Equivalent representation such that: 
(a) Contingency analysis will be 
accurate. 
(b) To account for unreported changes 
in the external system. 
Suproblem 3  
Complete information for the internal 
system. 
Equivalent representation such that 
contingency analysis will be accurate. 
Complete information for the internal 
system. 
Equivalent representation such that: 
(a) Contingency analysis will be 
accurate. 
(b) To account for unreported changes 




Subproblem 4  
Given: 
Find: 
The subproblems will be stated in terms of the following accuracy 
and sensitivity indices. 
3.2 	Accuracy Indices  
The boundary buses are considered to be load buses throughout 
this investigation. The above assumption has an impact on the accuracy 
of the equivalent representation of the external system. Loosely 
speaking, accuracy means the ability of the equivalent system to re-
produce the true power flows and voltage levels of the internal system 
for a series of postulated outages in the internal system. The above 
defined accuracy can be measured with accuracy indices. The accuracy 
indices should reflect the confidence we have on the assumption that 
the boundary buses behave as load buses. 
Let N denote the number of postulated outages in the internal 
system and let b denote the number of the boundary buses. 
Define 
NN 	bb 





= 2Nb 	J 	J 	J 	J k=1 j=1 
where: 
lk 2k 
P j ,Pj 	A 	r eal injected power at the j
th 
bus before 
and after the k
th 
outage 
lk 2k Q. Q. 
	A 	 j
th reactive injected power at the 	bus 
J 	J 




MP A y 	max 	I plk 	p2ki 
k=1, . . . ,N 	 J I 
 j=1, . . . ,b 
MQ A X 	max 	
1 .21k 	22k1 
k=1, . . . ,N 	3 
j=1, . . . ,b 
(42) 
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An equivalent representation is accurate if 
S < 
and 
MP < MP 	 (44) 
MQ < MQ 
— — 
The values of S, MP, MW should be predetermined by engineering 
judgement, according to the requirements and applications of the equiva-
lence techniques. Definitely one needs more accuracy for on-line 
operation than for planning purposes. 
3.3 	Sensitivity Indices  
These indices should reflect how much the accuracy indices S, 
MP, MQ change when unreported changes take place in the external system. 
We denote, by A, the set of changes (line outages, generator 
outages) in the external system for which we are primarily interested. 
If for a change jEA the accuracy indices become (S)., (MP)., 
and (MQ)., we say that the equivalent representation is insensitive 
to this change if: 
(S). 










Cl , C2 , and C 3 are positive constants which will be predetermined by 
engineering judgement. 
Following, we present the four subproblems we defined earlier. 
For each subproblem the equivalent model will be presented and the 
associate tests. 
Subproblem 1  
The Norton-type equivalent model is used. The relevant theory 
was presented earlier. To compute the Norton-equivalent, sparsity 
techniques, and gaussian elimination will be applied. The model should 
be tested for accuracy for a set of outages in the internal system. 
If the tests are successful, the equivalent model is satisfactory. 
If not, the proposed method for subproblem 3 should be applied. 
Norton-type equivalents present a problem associated with the 
sparsity of the equivalent model. If the number of boundary buses b 
is large, i.e the internal system is highly interconnected to the 
external system, the sparsity of the equivalent model is destroyed; 
the Norton equivalent will give 
b(b -1)  
2 
equivalent branches between the boundary buses and therefore the admit-
tance matrix of the internal system will not be any longer sparse. 
Some compromise between desirable accuracy and sparsity is necessary. 
We propose a very simple scheme. 
For each branch j of these 
b(b-1) 
 equivalent branches, compute 
N 




(FQ). = 	1 (2 2. 1( 1 'j N L 
k=1 
2 






Reject all branches which have been generated by the equivalent 
and which satisfy the following inequalities: 
(rP). < FP 
J 
The threshold values FP and IQ will determine the compromise 
between accuracy and sparsity. 
Subproblem 2  
We use, again, as equivalent model the Norton-type equivalent. 
The model should first be tested for accuracy for a given set of pos-
tulated outages in the internal system. 
Next the sensitivity of this model to changes in the external 
system is examined. For these outages which the model is sensitive, 
a detection scheme needs to be developed. 
We propose a detection scheme based upon the assumption that 
the decoupled model between (MV-8) and (MVAR-V) is valid. The motive 
for this assumption is that we are interested in detection and not 
accuracy. 
We assume also that: 
(1) The susceptances of the transmission lines are 
much higher than the conductances, i.e. 
G., = 0 
1 3 
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(2) Voltage magnitudes are constant and equal to 
1 p.u., i.e. 
v. = 1 p.u. 
(3) The voltage phase angle difference across a 
line is small, i.e. 
sin(O. - O.) = 6. -0 . 
j 
One can write then for the entire area 
P = AO (48) 
where P is the vector of real injections and 














a(i) 	is the 
bus. 
















connected to the 
(49) 
where the subscripts E and R refer to external and reduced system 
respectively. By eliminating O E from (49), one obtains 
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Aeq = ARR - AAA RE EE ER 
P-eq = PR - AREAEEE - 
Notice that changes in the external system affect not only the 
injections at the boundary buses but also the impedances of the equiva-
lent branches between the boundary buses. The detection scheme is based 
on the following theorem. 




and 3 	buses of the external system, the vector of the 
voltage phase angles of the reduced system changes by a vector AO 
R 
such that: 
A A6 = AC 
eq --R - 
(51) 
where A is a constant and C a vector which completely characterizes the 
line outage. The vector C is defined as: 



































a = B.. 
By applying the matrix inversion lemma, one obtains: 
(55) 




 = (A 
EE 
	ae. .e..) = A 	Ae..e..A 
EE 	 -23-a3 	EE D EE-a3-a3 EE 
where: 
T -1 
D = 1 + ae..A e.. (scalar) 
-a3 EE-a3 
Let's define as 
(3 A A l e.. 	 (58) 
= EE-i3 
then 
-1 	-1 	a 	T 
(A' ) = A - - 1313  
EE 	EE D 
The equivalent model after the outage becomes: 




- ARE ( AEE - D 	) AER 
= A + A 	
T
A 
eq D RE-- ER 








where C was defined earlier. 
The modified vector of the real injection is: 
T 1 





-eq -R 	RE EE D EE-ij-1j EE -E 
= PR -A A P + 	 A A e..e..A P 
RE EE-E D RE EE-aj-aj EE-E 
If we define as p = T -1 
 -aj 
e..A
EE  PE 
 (scalar), then 
ap 
P' = P 	+ 	C 
-eq -eq D 
If the voltage phase angles of the buses in the internal system, after 
the outage in the external system, change from O R to 
0 + A8 
-R --R 
then 
A' (0 + AO_) = P' 	 (63) 
eq -R 	 -eq 
where: 
A 	• 0 = P 
eq -R -eq 
By substituting the expressions for A' and P' , one obtains: 
eq 	eq 
(A 	+ 	C C
T
)(0 + AO ) = P 	+C
a 	 ap 







A O R  A AO + - C C (0 + AO ) = P + ap — C 











 + Ae ) 
- - --R 
is scalar. The above expression can be written as: 
A AO = 	fp - C
T
(8 + Ae )IC 












 + AO—R )} Q.E.D. 	 (68) 
Since the study area is observable to a state estimator, the 
vectors E)
R 
and 8 R + A8_ i.e. the voltage phase angles of the buses te 
of the study area before and after the outage in the external system 
are known. The vector 
Y A A 	• AO 
eq --R 
(69) 
is also a known vector. 
If NOUT is the number of the lines of the external system for 
which we are interested, then for each one there is a vector 
C. 	i = 1, . 	. ,NOUT 
-1 
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and a corresponding normalized vector C. . 
—a,N 
When the estimator detects a sudden change in the voltage phase 
angles, the vector y and the corresponding normalized vector 
—N 
 y are 
calculated. 
For each vector C. , the inner product 
—a,N 
y 	• C. 
—N 
is computed. The line outage gives the maximum inner product. 
Subproblem 3  
We propose to obtain the equivalent model by using data from 
on-line environment scheduled switching operations together with on-
line state estimation. The unknowns of the model are the conductances 
and susceptances of the equivalent branches between the boundary buses 
and optional shunt susceptances at the boundary buses. 
Let u denote the vector of all unknown network equivalent 
parameters and x denote the vector of boundary complex bus voltages. 
Assume that prior to an outage k (k=1, . 	. ,N) x is known and given 
by x
lk
. Also assume that following that outage, x is also known and 
given by x
2k
. The vectors of real and reactive injections at the 
boundary buses before and after the k
th 



















A vectors of pre and post-outage injected 






r 	 A vectors of pre and post-outage power 
flows from the boundary buses to the 












internal system admittances). 
Note that the injections I are linear in u. The problem is: 
Find u such that the vectors of real and reactive injections remain 
constant before and after the outages, i.e. the boundary buses behave 
as load buses. 
One can write 
C
k 




 ) - A(x
2k 





= F u + M
k 
The vector u is computed by minimizing the quadratic performance 
index: 
N 













 u + Mk )} 
k=1 
and the optimal solution will be: 
, 	N 	 N 
Z kTk-1 r kTk 
u = - [ Z (F ) F ] 	[ L (F ) M  






with this value for u, the performance index becomes: 
N 	1, 
kTkT 	k T k -1 	kTk 
J = 	( ,4- )Tyr - [ 	(F ) M 	( 2, (F ) F ) ( (F ) M ) 
k=1 	 k=1 	 k=1 	 k=1 
Note that J = 2NbS, where S is the index for accuracy defined earlier. 
This model should be tested for accuracy for the given set of 
N outages. If the tests are successful, this model is satisfactory. 
If not, we propose to find the equivalent model by solving the following 
problem. 










C 	< C. 
lc 
1 1  
(76) 
for all i, k=1, . 	. ,N. 
The solution of the above problem will be satisfactory if the 
performance index J, evaluated at the optimum, satisfies the following 
constraint: 
J < 2NbS 
Subproblem 4  
We propose to use as equivalent model the models we derived for 
subproblem 3. The sensitivity of the model to changes in the external 
system should be examined. The detection scheme applicable for Norton 
equivalents, is not applicable in this case. 
Assume that data from M switching operations in the internal 
(75) 
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system while changes in the external system took place are available. 
This information can be incorporated with similar ideas we used to 
obtain the equivalent representation earlier. 
Find u such that: 
J = 7 





For this model, evaluate the indices for accuracy and sensitivity. If 
these indices are satisfactory, the model is an acceptable one. If not, 
find u such that 
N+M 
J = 
y (ck ) Tck 
k=1 
is iliinimum and subject to 
ICkI < C. 	 (78) 
for all i, k=1, . 	. ,N+M. 
This model does not guarantee insensitivity to all unreported 
changes in the external system. However, it is the best model for 
the available information. 
3.4 	Discussion 
In the beginning of this section, the general form of the equiva-
lent problem has been stated. The possible types of information availab_e 
to find the equivalent model and the types of constraints the equivalent 
model should satisfy are defined. The size of the problem is huge and 
direct solution would present implementation difficulties. Instead of 
solving the general problem directly, four subproblems were introduced 
and solution to these subproblems were proposed. 
Mathematically speaking, the problem is an optimization one. 
Find a vector u subject to equality constraints (load flow 
equations before and after a set of outages) 
g(u) = 0 
	
(79) 
and subject to inequality constraints 
F
1 
 (u) 5 0 (accuracy) 	 (80) 
— — 
F (u) 5 0 (sensitivity) 	 (81) 







is selected. The statement of the problem is: 






F (u) 5 0 	 (84) 
F (u) 5 0 	 (85) 
— — 
In subproblems 1 and 2, the vector u is computed using network 
reduction (Norton equivalent) assuming that the topology and parameter 
values of the external system are known. If the performance index is 
satisfactory (less than J) and the inequalities are satisfied, the 
Norton-type equivalent model is an acceptable one. 
If the inequalities concerning the sensitivity of the model to 
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unreported external changes are violated, a detection scheme (sub-
problem 2) is proposed to alleviate this problem. If the external 
system is not known, or the performance index by using the Norton 
equivalent is not satisfactory, or constraints involving the accuracy 
of the model are violated, an equivalent model is proposed in sub-
problem 3 to minimize the performance index J. This model is then 
checked if it satisfies the inequality constraints. If the accuracy 
constraints are violated, the solution of the following problem is 
proposed. 










 (u) 	0 are then checked. If these inequali- 
— 




0 as it has been stated in subproblem 4. 





F (u) <C? YES 








_ES NO YES 
min J=a
T













type equivalent with 
the detection scheme 
This model is 
sufficient 
YES 
This model is 
sufficient 
- 





F (u) <0 
YES 
FIGURE 11. Flow Chart Summarizing all Possible 
Alternatives for Equivalencing in an 
On-Line Environment 
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4. 	TEST RESULTS  
The following parts of our research have already been completed. 
(1) A routine has been developed to compute the 
Norton-type equivalent when the topology and 
the parameter values of the external system 
are known. Gaussian elimination is the basis 
for the routine. To save computer space, 
sparsity techniques have been applied. 
(2) A routine has been developed to compute the 
equivalent model by using information from 
the internal system only. The equivalent 
model is computed by minimizing the per- 
formance index 
N 	1, 









The solution is given by: 
7 







k=1 	 k=1 
(3) Both routines above have been applied to a 30 bus 











The internal system consisted of eight buses from which three 
were boundary buses as is shown in Figure 12. Five outages were considered 
in the internal system. Results are shown in Table V. We found that 
shunt terms at the boundary buses improve the accuracy of the equivalent 
model. 
FIGURE 12. IEEE 30-Bus Test System Used in Simulation 
Analysis of Case 1. 
TABLE V 










G(8-25) .02380 .17797 .29743 
G(8-30) 	 7.36687 3.52793 - 	.09731 
G(25-30) 6.65502 4.77236 4.64301 
B;9-25) - 	.06060 .45051 - 	.13431 
3(8-30) -25.49960 -12.49867 .07769 
3(25-30) -23.77281 -24.13382 -23.75592 
BSHUNT(25) 	.0 .0 - 	.80172 
SSHUNT(30) .0 .0 -13.62277 
S(MVA)
2 
12.76 6.75 .35 
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INT ER 
Sy E lit 6 
xTERNAL 
SYST E H 
CASE 2 
The internal system consisted of ten buses from which four 
were boundary buses as is shown in Figure 13. Nine outages were 
considered in the internal system. Results are shown in Table VI. 
FIGURE 13. Case 2 Test System. 
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TABLE VI 





G (19-23) .16227 .11661 
G (19-25) .22402 .09799 
G(19-30) .06380 .18188 
0(23-25) .06406 .29518 
G (23-30) 4.39494 4.46412 
G(25-30) 6.45774 5.89974 
,B(19-23) .47219 .32902 
8(19-25) - 1.27638 - 1.28983 
B(19-30) - 6.02039 - 6.22274 
(23-25) .20294 .29537 
B (23-30) -15.55699 -15.65216 
B(25-30) -22.56372 -22.28394 
BSHUNT(19) .0 .50887 
BSHUNT(23) .0 .33407 
BSHUNT(25) .0 .13707 
BSHUNT (30) .0 .01755 
S (MVA) 2 1.41 _ 	1.077 
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(4) Both routines have been applied to a 444 bus system 
as the entire area. The internal system consisted 
of 87 busses from which 31 were boundary busses. 
For different sets of outages, the equivalent model, 
based on least squares optimization, was calculated. 
For each model the accuracy indices S, MP, and MQ 
were evaluated and were compared to the corresponding 
accuracy indices given by the Norton equivalent. 
Three examples are shown below. 



































S (WA', 341.75 
(MW) 





We found that for some outages the Norton-equivalent 
gave completely erroneous results. 
(5) A scheme to detect outages of transmission lines in 
the external system has been developed theoretically 
(page 21). 
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5. 	CONCLUSIONS  
In this section we presented the state of the art in the area of 
equivalence in power systems. 
Methods where buses from the external system are included 
jeopardize the accuracy of the equivalent representation since the 
status of the buses in the external system is unknown. 
Methods where the Norton equivalent is applied to the boundary 
buses do not guarantee the accuracy of the model over all the set of 
postulated outages. The reason is that non linear events are studied 
using a model obtained by linear reduction of the external system. 
The other drawback of the Norton-type equivalents is that they 
require complete knowledge of the external system but this information 
is not always available. Even if the topology and the parameter values 
of the external system are known, unreported changes in the external 
system affect the values of the impedances of the equivalent branches 
between the boundary buses. This is not taking into consideration by 
the existing methods. 
The proposed research covers the general case where the topology 
and the parameter values of the external system may or may not be avail-
able. In the first case, the Norton equivalent is applied to the boundary 
buses and is tested for accuracy and sensitivity to unreported changes 
in the external system. If the model is accurate, a detection scheme is 
proposed to enable the operator to detect these outages and modify 
the equivalent model accordingly. If the Norton equivalent is not 
accurate or no information for the external system is available, a 
model is proposed based on least square optimization using information 
f_om the internal system only. 
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In summary, the determination of the equivalent representation 
of an external system is basically an optimization problem. However, 
in many cases all the required information is not available. The 
proposed research will find the best equivalent representation for 





. A Real power flow from node i to node j 
J = 
U. A Reactive power flow from node i to node j 
= 
Gij + j B.. A Series admittance of branch i-j 1j = 
BSH. A Shunt admittance of branch i-j referred to node i 1 = 
a. A Tap setting in p,u. of the fixed-end tap of a transformer = 
E. + j F,
J 
 A Complex voltage at node i. 
aT. 4 
--II  B. = E F - E.F.
,. 	 J 

















= 	-E F. 









--II = + 1— ((2(E 2 + F2 ) - (E.E + F F ))G + (E F . - EF)B
ij
) 
aa .  ai 	i 	i 	ij 	ij 	ij 	i 	j i 
AD., 2 	2 
1 	a 
- II = 	(B (2(2 + 	ij 	i - EE - FFj ijlj  ) + 2BSHi (E i + F) + G (F.E. - Fji  E)) . 	ij1 
aT. 
__i 	1 
6a 	(G 1  (E.E j 	J 1 
+ F.F.) + B ij (F i E j - Fj E i )) 
.1 
a ij j 
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a J.. 	1 
1- = — (G (F.E • - F E ) - B (E.E + F F.)) 
a ai 	ij 	j 	ij 	j 	i 
REFERENCES 
1. A. S. Debs and W. H. Litzenberger, "The BPA State Estimator 
Project: Tuning of the Network Model," paper presented at 
Summer Power Meeting, San Francisco, CA, July, 1975. 
2. A. S. Debs and W. H. Litzenberger, "Implementation of the 
BPA On-Line State Estimator," paper presented at Power 
System Computation Conference, held in Cambridge, England 
in September 1975. 
3. A. S. Debs, R. E. Larson, and L. P. Hajdu, "On-Line Sequential 
State Estimation for Power Systems," Proceedings of 1972 Power 
System Computation Conference held in Grenoble, France. 
4. A. S. Debs, "Estimation of Steady-State Power System Model 
Parameters," IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and  
Systems, vol. PAS-93, No. 5, Sept./Oct. (1974). 
5. K. A. Clements and R. J. Ringlee, "Treatment of Parameter 
Uncertainty in Power System State Estimation," Paper C-74-
311-7 presented at Summer Power Meeting held in Anaheim, 
CA, July 1974. 
6. A. S. Debs, "Estimation of Model Parameters for Power System 
Monitoring and Control," proposal submitted to National Science 
Foundation (Engineering Division), and resulted in Grant 
GK-37474, December 1972. 
7. F. C. Schweppe--Discussion of Paper in Ref. 1 above. 
8. N. Sato and W. F. Tinney, "Techniques for Exploiting the 
Sparsity of the Network Admittance Matrix, IEEE Trans. on 
Power Apparatus and Systems, vol. 82, December 1963. 
9. Richard Bauman, et. al., "The Main Factors of Influence in the 
Mathematical Modeling of Actual Conditions in Power Systems," 
ETZ-A vol. 87, no. 32, Nov. 1966, pp. 818-823, Translated into 
English by approval of Bonneville Power Administration c/o 
H. W. Dommel. 
10. A. S. Debs, "Power System Model Inaccuracies and Sequential 
Tracking Estimation," Technical Memorandum PAU 949-3-1 pre-
pared for Bonneville Power Administration by Systems Control, 
Inc., Contract 14-03-79968, Exhibit F, October 1971. 
11. T. Stuart and C. J. Herget, "Sensitivity Analysis of Weighted 
Least Squares State Estimation for Power Systems," IEEE Trans. 
on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol. PAS-92, No. 5, Sept./Oct. 
1973. 
89 
12. K. A. Clements, et. al., "The Effects of Measurement Non-
Simultansity, Bias, and Parameter Uncertainty on Power 
System State Estimation," 1973 PICA Conference Proceedings, 
June 1973. 
13. A. S. Debs, "Data Base for Real-Time Power System Control," 
invited paper to Allerton Conference on Circuits and Systems 
held in Montecello, Illinois (October 1973). 
14. H. D. Merrill and F. C. Schweppe, "On-line system model error 
correction," IEEE Winter Power Meeting 1973, C73-106-2. 
15. E. Hanschin, Editor, "Real-Time Control of Electric Power 
Systems," Elsivice Publishing Co., New York, 1973. 
16. N. M. Peterson, W. F. Tinney, and D. W. Bree, "Iterative 
Linear AC Power Flow Solutions for Fast Approximate Outage 
Studies," IEEE Trans. PAS-91, no. 5, Sept./Oct. 1972. 
17. R. A. Pyne, "Bus Load Forecasting and Its Intended Use in 
System Security Analysis," 1974 Proceedings of IEEE Conference 
on Decision and Control held in Phoenix, Arizona, November 
1974. 
18. G. Contaxis and A. S. Debs, "Network Equivalents for On-Line 
Power System Security Assessment," presented at IEEE Southeast 
Conf., held in Clemson, SC, April 1976. 
J. F. Dopazo, et. al., "An External System Equivalent Model 
Using Real-Time Measurements for System Security Evaluation," 
paper F76370-7 presented at IEEE Summer Power Meeting, 
Portland, Oregon, July 1976. 
20. 	J. B. Ward, "Equivalent Circuits for Power-Flow Studies," 
AIEE Trans., vol. 68, pp. 373-382, 1949. 
21. A. S. Debs, A. R. Benson, "Security Assessment of Power 
Systems," Final Report to Energy Research and Development 
Administration prepared under contract to Georgia Institute 
of Technology, (July 1975). 
22. J. C. Kaltenbach, L. P. Hajdu, "Optimal Corrective Rescheduling 
for Power System Security," IEEE Trans. Power App. Syst., Vol. 
PAS-90, pp. 843-851, March/April 1971. 
23. T. E. DyLiacco, B. F. Wirtz, D. A. Wheeler, "Automation of the 
CEI System for Security," IEEE Trans. Power App. Syst., vol. 
PAS-91, pp. 831-843, May/June 1972. 
24. N. M. Peterson, W. F. Tinney, D. W. Bree, Jr., "Iterative Linear 
AC Power Flow Solution for Fast Approximate Outage Studies," 
IEEE Trans. Power App. Syst., vol. PAS-91, pp. 2048-2056, Sept./ 
Oct. 1972. 
90 
25. M. S. Sachdev and S. A. Ibrahim, "A Fast Approximate Technique 
for Outage Studies in Power System Planning and Operation," 
presented at IEEE PES Summer Meeting, Vancouver, July 15-20, 1973. 
26. B. Stott, 0. Alsac, "Fast Decoupled Load Flow," IEEE Trans. Power  
App. Syst., vol. PAS-93, pp. 859-869, May/June 1974. 
27. H. Duran, N. Arvanitidis, "Simplifications for Area Security 
Analysis: A new look at equivalence," IEEE Trans. Power App. 
Syst., vol. PAS-91, pp. 670-679, March/April 1972. 
28. W. F. Tinney, W. L. Powell, N. M. Peterson, "Sparsity-Oriented 
Network Reduction," 8th PICA Conference Proceedings, June 1973. 
29. D. Denzel, R. Graf, J. Verstege, "Practical Use of Equivalents 
for Unobservable Networks in On-Line Security Monitoring," 
Power Systems Computation Conference Proceedings, Cambridge, 
Sept. 1975. 
30. IBM Research Division, "Application of Security Indices and 
Restraints to a Real Power System," for the Electric Power 
Research Institute (February 1974). 
31. E. K. Paulsson, "Network Equivalents for On-Line Systems," 
paper presented at IEEE Summer Power Meeting, July 1974. 
32. F. C. Schweppe, "Role of System Identification in Electric 
Power Systems," Power Systems Computation Conference Proceedings, 
Grenoble, France, Sept. 1972. 
33. A. S. Debs, "Estimation of External Network Equivalents from 
Internal System Data," IEEE Trans. Power App. Syst., vol. PAS-
93, no. 2, pp. 273-279, March/April 1975. 
34. W. F. Tinney, J. W. Walker, "Direct Solutions of Sparse 
Network Equations by Optimally Ordered Triangular Factori-
zation," Proc. IEEE, vol. 55, pp. 1801-1809, Nov. 1967. 
35. W. D. Stevenson, Jr., Elements of Power System Analysis, 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962. 
36. H. A. Taha, Operations Research: An Introduction, New York: 
MacMillan Publishing Co., 1971. 
91 
